Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/06/2007

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July 15, 20071 Volume 1 I No. 14 Greengael sued the county in court, asserting constitutional and Fair Housing violations and seeking monetary damages. The claims were dismissed for lack of administrative exhaustion. Greengael then sought administrative review of the decision ro deny his subdivision applica- tion; his claims were ulrimately denied. Greengael, having exhausted its administrative remedies, appealed to COlli-r. The court dismissed his claims for damages again, this th"TIe citing the legal doctrine res judicata. This doctrine prevents a party from bringing a claim that has been heard back to court. However, the court did find that the county had acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it approved the rezoning and denied Greengael's subdivision based on the change. Greengael appealed the decision dismissing its claims, and the county appealed the decision finding it had acted arbitrarily and capricious- ly. The appeals court upheld the fii"1ding thar Greengael's claims were barred, but it reversed the finding against the county. Greengael appealed again. Decision: Dismissed. Greengael claimed that rhe lower court had erred when it found that res judicata applied in its case, stating that no court had actually heard the merits of its claim because the original case was dismissed. However, the court found that" [w ]hen filing suit over a given incident, a plaintiff [had to] bring all of his [or her] arguments to the table at one time in one suit,. or risk losing rhem forever." Res judicata, also called issue preclusion, occurred when a second suit was brought between the same LWO par-Lies on the same cause of action, provided that: "judgment in the former {was] conclusive of the latter, not only as to every question which was decided, but also as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and had de- termined, within the issues as rhey were made or tendered by the plead- ings, or as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, whether the same, as a matter of fact, were or were not considered." To determine if the doctrine applied, the court had to establish if the cause of acrion in both claims was the same. If rhe same facts or evi- dence would sustain both actions, men the two actions were considered the same and a judgment in one barred ai"1Y subsequent action. If differ- ent proof was required to sustain the different actions, a judgment in one would not bar the maintenance of the other. Here, despite never having argued the merirs of its claims in court, Greengael was barred from bringil"lg them agaitl. Although Greengael contended that the preclusion should nor have been triggered, the court here found rhat the lower courr's ruling that the county had acted with- 9 109