Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/06/2007

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Zoning Bulletin received a special exception to operate a junkyard on the premises under the condition that it complied with a chapter of the zoning code pertain- ing IO junkyards. Darrah applied for and received permission to operate a car shredding facility on the property. The facility was the size of two football fields and cost $3 million to construct. On average, the facility shed 300 to 500 cars or 750 tons of material every day. After a fire on the premises, the town- ship sought to enforce a section of the junkyard ordinance that limited the heighT of stored materials to six feet. In response, Darrah filed a petition seeking to reclassify the facility as a "processing establishmem." Whereas The junkyard required a special ex- cepTIon permit, processing establishments were approved uses in the in- dustrial zone. The zoning office denied Darrah's request. Darrah filed an appeal and a hearing was held. At the hearD."l.g, Darrah claimed that the facility was used primarily for shredding vehicles. He stated that the company did not store, accumulate, or sell cars or car parts like a junkyard usually did. Darrah stressed that he was not contesting the junkyard ordinance itself, but, rather, he was asking the board to find that his business did not classify as a junkyard by definition given its nature. The board denied the appeal, noting that the ordinance defined a junk- yard as "any place where junk... [wasJ stored or accumulated." The ordi- nance further defined junk as "any discarded or salvageable article or ma- terial including, bur not limited to, scrap metal...[andJ...motor vehicles." In addition, the board found that Darrah could not claim that it was not a junkyard when it was licensed as a junkyard. Darrah appealed the board's decision to court. The trial court, hearing no additional evidence but finding no error of law, affirmed the board's decision. Darrah appealed again. Decision: Decision of the board vacated. On appeal, Darrah's sole argument was that the board and trial court erred in concluding that the aCTIvities performed on the property were those of a jUlLk..-yard as defined in the zoning ordinance. Darrah insisted that the evidence demonstrated that the property was being used as a pro- cessing establishment, and, because the term "processing establishment" was not defined D."l. the ordD."l.ance, the court had to give the landowner the benefit of the least restrictive interpretation for its use and enjoyment of the property. Without deciding on the merits of this argument, however, the COurT rOUJ."l.d that the board lacked jurisdiction to interpret an ordinance without a specific request for relief. In general, zonD."l.g boards only had the author- ity to carry out tasks thaT were specifically conferred upon them by the leg- islature. Here, because Darrah had not requested a ,:ariance, permit, spe- cial exception, or challenged the junk.-yard ordinance as invalid-the only matters over which the board had jurisdiction-the board had abused its discretion in actD."l.g on his request. Darrah had asked the board for an "in- terpretation/appeal," which was beyond the board's jurisdiction. 8 120