Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/03/2008

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I I j I I II 11 II II II !I II II !I I, II Ii Ii II II 1\ I; /' Ii i: Ii II Ii I( , " ! Ii I' ,I 'I Ii I: II Ii II I' ,I If ! ; I~\ ( ) (~'~ t. December 10, 2007 I Volume 1 I No. 23 made allowances for such a sign by providing a minimum time each message had to be displayed before switching to the other message. The town notified Chapin on several occasions that its sign was in violation of the ordinance, but it did not fine or initiate legal action against Chapin. Subsequently, Chapin filed a. lawsuit against the town, claiming that the ordinance violated its free speech'rigqts under the First Amendment. Both Chapin and the town asked for judgm~nt without a trial. A hearing was held, at which time the town told the court that it was in the process of revising the ordinance. It claimed that Chapin's claims were therefore moot. Ultimately, the court gra.nted judgment to tht town, but not with- out concluding that Chapin's claims were not moot. Chapin appealed, claiming that the lower court had erred when it found that the sign or- dinance was content-neutral-which was a requirement for a regulation that restricted speech to pass constitutional muster-because it con- tained the exception for government signs. DECISION: Case dismissed. Although the lower court had found that Chapin's claim was not moot, the appeals cC?urt found that, given the revision of the sign ordi- nance, it had becom~ so. Essentially, the revised ordinance addressed all of the challenges raised by Chapin. The revised ordinance did not contain an exception for governmen- tal signs or for signs displaying only time and temperature information. Chapin had also argued that the ordinance was overbroad, another con- stitutional violation, because it did not provide a timeframe by which the town had to act on permit applications, but the revised <;>rdinance stated that permit requests would be acted upon within two weeks of receipt of all necessary documentation. Chapin contended, however, that even if its claims for relief were mooted by the revised ordinance, its claim for damages still presented a "live controversy." But Chapin could not claim damages as the ordi- nance was never enforced against it and it never suffered any constitu- tional deprivation. The appeals court noted that, notwithstanding Chapin's violation of. the ordinance, the town never penalized it. Chapin testified that it had used the offending sign throughout its dispute with the town; any con- tention that Chapin's speech was limited by the ordinance was thus en- tirely undermined. The case was dismissed for mootness and for failure to state a claim. See also: Tanner Advertising Group, L.L.G. v. Fayette County, GA,451 R3d 777 (11th Cir. 2006). 3 65