Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/05/2009

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ii ,I :1 \: i , i ! I i II !I 11 'I II !I 'I Ii II Ii Ii \i il I, 11 ,I 11 \! ji , ,. ii lj 11 il II I' il I, " 'I 'I I. H II ~! 'II (~') December 10, :Z008\ Volume 21 No. 23. .~.--.. Protection Agency; and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. However, the Town Council, and the town's planning and zoning commission and wetland and watercourse commission (collec- ti~ely, the "Town") rejected the Authority's application for the Proje<:t. Ultimately, the Authority filed a legal action in court. It sought to pro- hibit the Town from interfering with the Project. It asked the court to de- clare that the Town's municipal powers to regulate land use ("regulatory actions") were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), the Federal Aviation Act ("FAAct") and state law. DECISION: Ordered accordingly (Town prohibited from taking any ac- . tion that would stop, change, interfere with, or delay the Project.). The court concluded that the Town's regulatory actions were not pre- . empted under the ADA, but were impliedly preempted by the FAAct. The court explained that state a~d municipal laws could be express- ly or impliedly preempted by federal law. Express preemption arose when "a federal statute expressly direct[ed] that state [~nd municipal] law be ousted." Implied preemption could arise in one of two ways: (1) when despite explicit statutory language, Congress intend[ed] the Federal Government occupy a field exclusively ("field preemption"); or (2) when state (or municipal) law actually conflicted with federal law in that compliance with both was a "physical impossibility" and compli- ance with state law' stood as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress ("conflict preemption"). . The Authority had argued that the ADA and the FAAct expressly pre- empted the Town's regulations because a provision in the ADA expressly prohibited.a state or municipality.from enforcing a regulation that "re- lated to a price, route, or service of an air carrier ;..." The court noted that a municipal regulation that even indirectly effected rates, routes and services of air carriers was preempted by the ADA. Still, the court con- cluded that the Town's regulations were not expressly preempted by the . ADA because while it was possible that the Town's regulations might im- pact rolites and services at the Airport, there was no definitive proof of such an, impact. Specifically, there was no proof that the Town's actions in denying the Authority's application for the Project would result in the FAA withdrawing the Airport's operating certificate. Thus:, the court con- clud~d that federal legislation did not expressly preempt the Town's regu- lations 'and actions. The court, however, concluded that the FAAct impliedly preempted the,:Town's regulations and actions under the doctrine of field preemp- tion.;,The court found that both the language of the FAAct, as well as legislative history, showed that Congress intended to occupy and regulate the entire field of airline safety, including runways. The court noted that the Project's purpose was airline safety. @ 2008 Thornson Reuters/West 3 47 .