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<br />n <br /> <br />n <br /> <br />~;\>~ <br /> <br />Zoning Bulletin <br /> <br />July 25, 20091 Vo'um~ 31 No. 14 <br /> <br />Framingham nor any of its municipal boards had standing (i.e., the legal <br />right) to challenge the granting of the permit. Framingham maintained <br />that it did have standing because it was "aggrieved" in that, among oth- <br />er things: (1) the issuance of the permit would increase traffic on Ftam- <br />i,ngham streets; and (2) Chrysler's proposed development would have an <br />impact on its municipal emergency services. . <br />Chrysler and the ZBA fiied a joint motion to dismiss. They asked the <br />court to dismiss the action based on Frainingham's lack of standing. <br /> <br />DECISION: Order allowing. defendants' motion to dismiss. <br /> <br />The Massachusetts Land Court held that Framingham lacked stand- <br />ing to challenge the Natick ZBA's decision to grant a comprehensive per- <br />mit to Chrysler. . <br />The court noted that because Frall1ingham was not an . abutter to the <br />Property on which development was proposed, it did not have 'a "pre- <br />sumption' of standing." The court explained that Framingham would <br />thus only have standing to appeal the ZBA's decision.if it qualified as a <br />"person aggrieved." However, the court said that: "the Legislature did <br />not intend to give municipal boards and officers standing to appeal'from <br />the grant of comprehensive permits;" and a town col,lld not get around <br />"the fu.nitations on standing by appealing in its own name when a mu- <br />nicipal board or official [wa]s precluded from doing so." Further, a town <br />was not a "person" and thus could not qualify as a "person aggrieved." <br />Nevertheless, Framingham had argued that it did have standing be- <br />cause its injury (i.e., increased traffic on its streets and impact on its <br />emergency services) was a private injury,' as opposed to a general,; pub- <br />lic injury. The land court disagreed. It said that in order to have stand- <br />ing under Mass. Gen. 1. c. 40B, F~amingham had to demonstrate that: <br />(1) Chrysler's development would injure Framingham's personal legal <br />interests; and (2) any injured interest was one that c. 40B intended to <br />protect. Here, the court found that the alleged injury-increased traffic~ <br />Was not personal to Framingham; it was not "special and different from <br />the concerns of the rest of the community." Traffic related,to Chrysler's <br />development would travel over public streets of Framingham, Natick <br />and the Commonwealth. Mqreover, traffic was not a harm that G.L. c. <br />.40B was intended to protect, said the court. Rather, "[w]hen weighed' <br />against the possibility of injury to private rights, the legislature's intent in <br />enacting G.L. c. 40B, to encourage the construction of affordable hous- <br />ing, ttump[ed] any harm or injury caused to Framingham by increased <br />traffic." Furthe~ as to Framingham's claim of a "serious impact on its <br />delivery of emergency services," that issue had been considered by the <br />ZBA and conditions of the permit mitigated any injury to Framingham <br />as Chrysler was required to contribute funds to Natick for a construc- <br />tion of a new fire station. . <br /> <br />@ 2009 Thomson Reuters <br /> <br />3 <br /> <br />55 <br />