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<br />Zoning Bulletin <br /> <br />July 25, 20091 Volume 31 No. 14 <br /> <br />(''7.\ . .~y April ~007, no.ac~ion had been taken by the BSED on either the <br />(.:). nnnal or revised applicatiOns. . . <br />l< & P (along with H.D.'Y.-Greektown, LLC, the prospective purchaser. <br />of K & P's adult cabaret) brought a lawsuit against the city. Among other <br />things, the lawsuit alleged that the city's sign ordinances (the "Ordinanc- <br />~s"): (1) constituted a facially unconstitutional (in violation of the First <br />Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) prior restraint on speech; and (2) <br />were unconstitutional as applied to K & P. K & P maintained that the <br />Ordinances were unconstitutional because they: vested the city with "un- <br />bridled discretion" to grant or deny permits since they did not contain <br />specific grounds for the denial of sign-permit applications; and failed to <br />place any time limits on the city for acting on sign-permit applications. <br />The Ordinances contained separate definitions for various types of <br />signs, and imposed different height requirements on different types of <br />signs, The Ordinances prohibited signs without a permit, but failed to <br />describe any "definitive process which proscribed the route. that entre- <br />preneurs must follow in order to obtain a business sign permit that satis- <br />fied the parameters of the [O]rdinances." <br />K & P filed a motion for sllIlimary judgment, asking the district court . <br />~ to find that there were no material iSsues of fact in dispute and to decide <br />1(')' the matter on the law alone in their favor. Specifically, they asked the. <br />district court to: (1) enjoin the city from enforcing the challenged Or- <br />dinances; (2) declare that K & P was legally entitled to erect the signs <br />described in the revised application; and (3) permanently enjoin the city <br />from interfering in any manner with their erection of the signs. <br />The district court issued an order granting in part and denying in part <br />K & P's motion. It held that. the city's sign .Ordinances were .not 'uncon.:. <br />stitution~.l on their face. Accordingly, it declined to permanently enjoin <br />enforcement of those Ordinances. However, the district court also held <br />that the city's failure to act on the app1ic!ltions within a reasonable time <br />rendered the Ordinances unconstitutional as applied to K & P. Thus, the <br />court enjoined the city from preventing K & P's ereCtion of their pro- <br />posed signs. <br />K & P appealed the portions of that ruling that were unfavorable to <br />them. They argued that the Ordinances did, in fact, amount to a facially <br />unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Consti- <br />tUtion) prior restraint on speech. <br /> <br />DECISION: Affirined. <br /> <br />C.)i <br /> <br />The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, held that the city's <br />sign Ordinance,s, and the sign-permit application process derived from <br />them, were facially constitutional. <br /> <br />@ 2009 Thomson Reuters <br /> <br />5 <br /> <br />! <br /> <br />I <br />:/ <br />I <br />, I <br /> <br />! <br /> <br />57 <br />