Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/05/2009

Home

July 25, 2009\ Volume 3\ No. 14 . Zoning Bulletin In so holding, the court disagreed with K & P's contention that the' Ordinances were content-based and thus should be reviewed for con- stitutionality under the standard that applied t~ content-based regula- tions. Rather, the court found that th~. Ordinances were content-neutral because they: (1) controlled oilly the places where the speech may o~- cur; (2) were not adopted because of disagreement with the' message that the speech conveyed; and (3) the city's interests in the regulations were unrelated to the content of the affected speech. In other. words, the court found there was "simply nothing in the record to indicate that the distinctions [in the Ordinances] between the various types of signs reflect[ ed] a meaningful preference for one type of speech over another." The distinction in the Ordinances between the different types of signs did "not constitute an impermissible regulation of content just because the determiriation of whether a sign [wa]s permitted at a given: location [w~] s a: function of the sign's message." Having found that the Ordinances did not discriminate based upon content, the court applied the standard for determining the constitu- tionality of "content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions." The court found the Ordinances were constitutional because they: (1) con- . tained adequate standards to guide the city's decision (i.e., particular lim- itat~ons on. s~e, b,eight, location, area, and setback); (2) were not based on the content of the message (as discussed above); (3) were narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest (of aesthetics and safety) in that they permitted the denial of a permit only on the grounds outlined therein; and (4) left open ample alternatives for communication because (a) they permitted the erection of signs that met the city's stan- dards criteria; and (b) businesses were also "free to use any of the myri- ad other forms of available communication (e.g., print, television, radio, etc.) to advertise." K & P had argued that content-neutral licensing ordinances also had to: (1) contain a brief, specified time limit; and (2) require the decision maker to specify the grounds for denying an application. The court dis- agreed, finding "these additional factors were [not] requirements to pre- vent a content-neutral regulation from being declared unconstitutional." See also: Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 122 S. Ct. 775, 151 L. Ed. 2d 783, 02 c.D.a.S. 377, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 495, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 71, 2002 WL 46757 (2002) See also: Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, Com. of Ky., 822 R2d .-586,56 U.S.L. -w: 2023 (6th Cir. 1987). .. Case Note: K & P had also challenged the constitutionality of the city's adult-use zoning ordinances. The district court had found the 6 @ 2009 Thomson Reuters 58 ('\ , ) (:-;, > ( . ,.)