Laserfiche WebLink
Zoning Bulletin March 10, 2070 ~ Volume 4) No. 5 <br />~~ Outdoor LLC; and Willow Media, LLC (collectively, "Clear Channel"). <br />Cleaz Channel owned large (e.g., ranging in size from 315 squaze feet <br />to 11,258 square feet) billboards located near arterial highways in New <br />York City (the "City"). Clear Channel challenged the constitutionality of <br />the City Zoning Resolution §§ 42 to 55 and 32 to 662. These provisions <br />"ban offsite advertising signs within 200 feet of, and within sight of, ar- <br />terial highways in manufacturing and commercial districts." <br />The second case involved the plaintiff, Metro Fuel LLC. Metro Fuel ~ <br />owned smaller "panel" advertising signs. These panel signs were inter- <br />nally illuminated poster advertisements that were approximately 24 <br />square feet. Metro Fuel's signs were placed on: "undeveloped lots, such <br />as parking lots"; "affixed to the front of businesses, usually at or near i <br />ground level"; or "placed inside parking garages near the means of in- <br />gress and egress." Metro Fuel challenged the constitutionality of provi- i <br />sions of the City's Zoning Resolution that "control[led] where it may <br />place its panel advertisements; and how it may illuminate them." <br />More specifically, both Clear Chammel and Metro Fuel (collectively, <br />the "Plaintiffs") alleged that the Ciry's zoning regulations violated their <br />First Amendment rights because the regulations were "unconstitutionally <br />7mderinclusive." They argued the Zoning Resolution was underinclusive i <br />because: "no meaningful distinctions" existed between their signs and <br />billboards, which faced regulatory enforcement for violation of the Zon- i <br />(~1 ing Resolution, and other signs and billboards that the City permitted- <br />`._ , ~ particularly signs and billboards that the city allowed on city-owned i <br />property: In other words, they maintained that the City violated the First <br />Amendment "protections afforded commercial speech" by distinguishing <br />(in enforcement and/or regulation) between the Plaintiffs' signs or bill- <br />boards and those located on government property. <br />Clear Channel alleged that the City was seeking to "newly enforce its ~ <br />ban on arterial advertising signs on private property while permitting ' <br />offsite advertising signs on government property." For example, the City <br />exempted from the Zoning Resolution arterial advertising signs on tran- ~ <br />sit authority property. <br />Metro Fuel noted that a franchise contract entered into by the City ~, <br />with a private company, Cemusa, Inc., allowed Cemusa to place adver- ~~, <br />tisements on street furniture, such as bus shelters. Metro Fuel noted that , <br />those advertisements, which were similar to its advertisements, were not ~ <br />subject to the Zoning Resolution. It azgued that this exception was.evi- <br />den~e of the regulation's unconstirutionaliry. i~ <br />Both Plaintiffs also argued that these exceptions to the City's sign reg- '~ <br />ulations "undermine[d] and counteract[ed]" the City's asserted interests <br />in aesthetics and traffic safety. I <br />Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and decid- I <br />ing the matter on the law alone, the district court ultimately issued sum- <br />mary judgment in favor of the City. The district court held that: "the ii <br />~-~ `City's zoning regulations ... satisfy the constirutional test for commer- <br />cial speech restriction and are not unconstirutionally underinclusive."' <br />In reaching that conclusion, the court found that: "the `few exceptions to <br />®2070 Thomson Reuters <br />31 <br />