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t08. The council-manager plan. The council-
<br />manager plan of city administration was given its
<br />start'in the United States when in 1908 the city
<br />counci! of Staunton, Virginia, abolished adminis-
<br />tration by council committees and employed a
<br />"general manager" for its business. The plan was
<br />first embodied in a city charter by Sumter, South
<br />Carolina, in 1912, and in 1913 both Dayton and
<br />Springfieid, Ohio, foltowed suit.11 Since 1914, it
<br />has spread with even greater rapidity than did the
<br />commission plan at the time of its greatest popular-
<br />ity. Nationally, over 2,300 cities operate under the
<br />plan and it now predominates in the cities between
<br />25,000 and 250,000. A quarter' of Minnesota's
<br />home rule cities use the council-manager plan and
<br />it is in operation in more than a dozen statutory
<br />cities as well.
<br />
<br /> Tile foundation stones upon' which the manager
<br />plan is built are the short ballot, the unification of
<br />powers, the concentration of responsibility, the
<br />separation of po]it[cs from administration, and the
<br />use of non-partisan trained experts in the adminis-
<br />tration. Tile voters are given the advantage of the
<br />short ballot, for they are called upon to elect only
<br />the city council, in this council all the powers of
<br />the city government are vested, so.that it and it
<br />alone can be held responsible for the entire city
<br />government. Just as the council can be held respon-
<br />s[ble for the entire city government, so can it in
<br />turn hold its chief servant, the manager, responsible
<br />for the administration of affairs. The council is
<br />elected by political methods through popular elec-
<br />tion, but it is required to select its chief adminis-
<br />trator without regard to political considerations,
<br />and being a political body the council is forbidden
<br />by the charter to meddle with details of adminis-
<br />tration, though it may remove the manager himself
<br />at any time. Thus the function of determining all
<br />policies and of controlling the administration is
<br />vested in the council exclusively, but the actual
<br />work of administration is done by men removed
<br />from politics and without any control over policies.
<br />As the manager is selected for his administrative
<br />ability, so he in turn is supposed to select all his
<br />assistants upon the basis of their fitness alone, and
<br />it is to his advantage to do so.
<br />
<br /> The mere description of this plan indicates the
<br />nature of the arguments commonly put forward in
<br />support of it. Almost everything that can be said in
<br />favor of either the federal plan or the commission
<br />plan can also be said in favor of this one. It central-
<br />
<br />izes responsibility and unifies the powers of govern-
<br />ment as much as or more than either of these two
<br />plans, and in addition it separates politics from ad-
<br />ministration.
<br />
<br /> The usual arguments against this plan are-as
<br />follows:
<br />
<br /> First, that it is autocratic, that it vests too much
<br />power in one man. In fact, however, the manager is".
<br />not given as much power in this plan as is the mayor
<br />in the federal plan, and besides, the manager is
<br />kept constantly under the control of the council
<br />which may dismiss him at any time., in fact the
<br />manager cannot be an auto.crat, for he is only the
<br />chief servant of the council to do what it commands
<br />without any control over its policies.
<br />
<br /> Second, it is also said that the plan is undemocra-
<br />tic because it may give an important local position '
<br />to an outsider, which seems to be a slur on Iocaf
<br />talent and a denial of the fitness of' every man to
<br />fill any public position. This argument is based on
<br />'the feeling that public office is a reward rather
<br />than a trust, and that local residents should be en-
<br />titled to ali local offices. In fact, the council may
<br />select a local resident as manager if it so desires,
<br />but when it does so it is running the risk of getting
<br />a man interested in local politics, thus defeating its
<br />own purpose of getting an impartial trained admin-
<br />istrator. The local range of choice is narrowly lim.i~
<br />ted and there may not be any local resident fully
<br />qualified by trainingand experience for the position
<br />of manager.
<br />
<br /> Third, it is said that a manager chosen from out-
<br />side the city will not know local needs and condi-.
<br />tions. This is true, but in fact he scarcely needs to.
<br />It is for the council to say what is to be done, ~o
<br />decide all questions of policy, and it is for the man-
<br />ager to know principles of municipal administration
<br />so as to carry out the council's wishes most effec-
<br />tively. He will soon come to know his city.
<br />
<br /> Fourth, it is alleged that there are no such ex-
<br />pert and trained city administrators as. the manager
<br />plan requires. This was once true but it is scarcely
<br />true any longer, and the statement conceals a larger
<br />truth. Through graduate training programs in uni-
<br />versities supplemented by on-the-job training as
<br />administrative assistants in managers' offices and
<br />other posts providing managerial experience, there
<br />has been 'provided enough competent managerial.'
<br />
<br />llSee the diagram of this plan in the League mem-
<br /> orandum "Four General Types of Government
<br /> Structure in Use in American Cities." 390e.?.
<br /> See also "The Pros and Cons of the Council-
<br /> Manager plan," 390e.8. -
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