Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/03/2011

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Zoning Bulletin December 25, 2010 Volume 41 No. 24 tising signs from having any of the following characteristics: "revolv- ing, moving, flashing, blinking, or animated." Subsequently, Lamar filed a referendum petition on the DSO, which ultimately failed. This delayed the effective date of the DSO until November 9, 2007. In the meantime, on September 27, 2007, while the effective date of the DSO was delayed, the city passed the "Pending Sign Legisla- tion Ordinance" (the "PSL"). The PSL provided that during the consideration of an amendment to the zoning code and "until such amendment is enacted (effective) or rejected," the building official was prohibited from acting on any application for a permit that would allow a sign that would be prohibited by the proposed amend- ment if enacted. The PSL effectively held Lamar's sign permit applica- tion in abeyance. Lamar filed a legal action. It challenged the city's basis for refus- ing to process its pending sign permit application. Lamar argued that the city should have processed the pending sign permit applications based upon the ordinances in effect at the time the permit applica- tions were presented (i.e., prior to the passage of the DSO). Lamar asked the court to declare that the PSL was invalid and unenforce- able. Lamar maintained that the city had failed to comply with zon- ing ordinance notice requirements prior to passing the PSL. The city asked the court to find that there were no material issues of fact in dispute and to issue summary judgment in its favor on the law alone. The city argued that Lamar's legal action was moot be- cause, at the time the court was hearing the issue, the PSL was no longer applicable. The DSO had been enacted. Under the terms of the DSO, Lamar was not entitled to its applied -for sign permits. Lamar countered that: (1) it had established a vested right to the application of the prior zoning ordinance (in effect prior to the DSO); and (2) therefore, it was not subject to the DSO. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, dis- missing the appeal as moot. Lamar appealed. The Court's Decision: Judgment of trial court affirmed. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that Lamar had no vested right in its applied -for sign permits. The court explained that under Missouri law, submission of an ap- plication for permit under a prior zoning ordinance is "not enough to establish a vested right to the continued application of the prior zoning ordinance." The fact that Lamar filed its application for a sign permit before the DSO went into effect was "no reason why [the © 2010 Thomson Reuters 3