Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/03/2011

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December 25, 2010 Volume 41 No. 24 Zoning Bulletin DSO] should not be held applicable to [Lamar] from and after it be- came operative." The filing of its sign permit application, gave Lamar no vested right. Even if the city had issued Lamar a sign permit, with the enactment of the DSO, it could have revoked or canceled the per- mit if there was no vested right in the permit. Lamar could only have a vested property right (to have a digital sign) if it had a valid nonconforming use of the property prior to the enactment of the DSO. This is known as the "nonconforming use ex- ception." To establish such a valid, prior nonconforming use, Lamar had to show either "actual use or a substantial step toward that use." In other words, the use of digital signs had to be "substantially estab- lished prior to the enactment of [the DSO]." Additionally, Lamar had to have "reasonably relied upon a belief that the existing law [(i.e., the ordinance existing prior to enactment of the DSO)] would con- tinue to be in force." Such reasonable reliance cannot be established, said the court, where a permit application is filed "not in good faith, but `in anticipation of the enactment of a zoning law. "' Here, Lamar applied for its sign permits, knowing that the DSO was scheduled for adoption two days later. Lamar was "seeking to obtain permits in an- ticipation of the enactment of [the DSO]." The court found this was not sufficient to establish a vested right in Lamar's proposed noncon- forming use of digital signs. The court concluded that because Lamar had not acquired a vest- ed right in the sign permits at the time the DSO was passed and be- came effective, the issue of whether the PSL was valid or not "had no practical effect upon the controversy with the city after [the enact- ment of the DSO, which prohibited Lamar's proposed signs]." Thus, the court agreed with the city that Lamar's action was moot. See also: State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720 (1927). See also: Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 363 Mo. 305, 251 S.W.2d 8 (1952). See also: Veal v. Leimkuehler, 249 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). Case Note: The court said that, under Missouri law, "even the issuance of a permit under a prior zoning ordinance" was not enough to establish a vested right to the continued application of the prior zoning ordinance. 4 © 2010 Thomson Reuters