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Zoning Bulletin April 25, 2011 I Volume 5 I No. 8 <br />non -railroads, except that land use regulations may not be applied <br />to existing facilities." <br />The Town again petitioned the STB, asking it to declare that the <br />CRA did not apply to the Facility. The STB did so declare. It found <br />that the CRA did not apply to the Facility because the Facility was <br />not "owned or operated by or on behalf of a rail carrier." Again, <br />the STB had found that NYAR "lacked control over the operation <br />of the Facility." <br />NYAR and Coastal appealed to the United States Court of Ap- <br />peals for the District of Columbia. That court transferred the case <br />to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. <br />DEICISION: Petition denied. <br />The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the <br />Town's Ordinance was not pre-empted by the ICCTA or the CRA. <br />The court noted that the ICCTA grants the STB exclusive juris- <br />diction over "transportation by rail carriers," which includes "wide <br />authority over transloading facilities." However, after analyzing the <br />statutory language (see 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(2)), the court deter- <br />mined that the STB does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Fa- <br />cilities when they are not operated by, or under the control of, a <br />"rail carrier." The STB could exercise exclusive jurisdiction only if: <br />the activity constituted "transportation"; and was performed by, or <br />under the auspices of, a "rail carrier." Here, the court found there <br />was "no question that the activity at issue ... constitutes 'transpor- <br />tation."' However, the court found the activity was not performed <br />by NYAR, the rail carrier. NYAR's involvement was essentially lim- <br />ited to transporting cars to and from the Facility, found the court. <br />Thus, the STB did not have jurisdiction over Coastal's activities, <br />and Federal pre-emption under the ICCTA did not apply. <br />Similarly, the court found that the CRA did not pre-empt the ap- <br />plication of the Town's Ordinance. Under the CRA, the STB only <br />had jurisdiction over "solid waste transfer facilities" under certain <br />exceptions. (See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10908(b)) Those exceptions applied <br />only to facilities that fell under STB's jurisdiction. Again, because <br />the Facility was not part of "transportation by rail carrier," it was <br />not within the STB's jurisdiction, and therefore the Facility was not <br />covered by the CRA. <br />See also: Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295 (3d <br />Cir. 2004). <br />See also: Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638 (2d <br />Cir. 2005). <br />© 2011 Thomson Reuters 5 <br />