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April 25, 2011 1 Volume 5 J No. 8 Zoning Bulletin <br />The Background/Facts: New York & Atlantic Railway Company <br />("NYAR") was a short -line railroad that ran the freight operation <br />of the Long Island Rail Road ("LIRR"). In 2002, Coastal Distribu- <br />tion, LLC ("Coastal") and NYAR entered into an agreement to re- <br />furbish a rail yard in the Town of Babylon (the "Town") to handle <br />the transloading of construction materials, mainly building materi- <br />als and construction and demolition debris (the "Facility"). <br />The Town's zoning ordinance (the "Ordinance") forbids the op- <br />eration of a waste transfer facility anywhere in the Town except for <br />an area remote from the Facility and inaccessible by rail. <br />As work on the new Facility neared completion, a Town build- <br />ing inspector served Coastal with a stop work order. The inspec- <br />tor had determined that the Facility violated the Ordinance. Coastal <br />appealed to the Town's Zoning Appeals Board (the "ZBA"). The <br />ZBA upheld the stop work order, finding the Facility constituted an <br />impermissible use. <br />NYAR and Coastal then sued in federal district court. They <br />asked the court to enjoin the stop work order. They argued that: <br />the Town's zoning Ordinance was pre-empted under the Interstate <br />Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"); and <br />that the Facility fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB. <br />The court issued a preliminary injunction barring the Town from <br />enforcing the stop work order. The United States Court of Appeals, <br />Second Circuit, upheld the injunction but allowed the parties to <br />bring the matter to the STB for a determination as to whether the <br />Facility did, in fact, fall within its exclusive jurisdiction. <br />The Town and the lessor of the rail yard, Pinelawn Cemetery <br />Corporation, (hereinafter, collectively, the "Town") asked the STB <br />to declare that: the Town's zoning Ordinance was not pre-empted; <br />and that STB did not have jurisdiction over the Facility. The STB <br />did so declare. The STB found that its exclusive jurisdiction "ex- <br />tends to the rail -related activities that take place at transloading fa- <br />cilities if the activities are performed by a rail carrier or the rail car- <br />rier holds out its own service through the third -party as an agent or <br />exerts control over the third-party's operation." Here, the STB de- <br />termined that NYAR was not involved with Facility and that Coast- <br />al "exercised almost total control over the [F]acility." <br />Thereafter, the Town asked the district court to vacate the pre- <br />liminary injunction. NYAR and Coastal objected. Among other <br />things, they argued that the "newly passed Clean Railroads Act of <br />2008 (the "CRA"), 49 U.S.C. S 10909, preempted [the Town's Or- <br />dinance]." The CRA "requires that solid waste rail transfer facilities <br />follow the same state and federal laws and regulations that apply to <br />4 © 2011 Thomson Reuters <br />