Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/1999

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· Page 4 -- March 10, 1999 Z.B. specifically implemented. The board also failed to show how an "implied con- dition'' could be grounds for revoking a permit under the zoning ordinance. The county had other enforcement remedies to resolve this situation. It could (and apparently did) commence an enforcement action on the parcel zoned agricultural/residential for zoning violations. The Bettendoffs weren't entitled to court costs because the landowners didn't show the board acted in bad faith, acted with malice, or was grossly negligent. see also: Brooks v. Hartland Sportsman's Club, 531 N. W.2d 445 (1995). see also: Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, 207 N. W.2d 585 (1973). Junkyard -- Are town's junkyard prohibitions too vague to be enforced? Citation: Town of Lakewood v. Martinson, Court of Appeals'of Minnesota, No. CX-98-932 (1999) Martinson lived in the town of Lakewood, Minn. Her neighbors Complained to the town about rusting vehicles and bther items on her property. In 1994, the town issued Martinson a criminal citation for violating the town zoning ordinance, which prohibited junk or salvage yards. The ordinance stated any vehicle that was either inoperable or didn't have current plates was a junk vehicle and provided the presence of three or more junk vehicles consti- tuted a salvage yard. The ordinance also stated that any place where "the sal- vaging or scavenging of goods, articles, or merchandise" wasn't contained within a buiIding constituted a junkyard. Martinson pleaded guilty and was fined. The city cited her for the same offense a year later, and she again pleaded guilty. The town sued Martinson in 1996, seeking a court order prohibiting her from violating the ordinance. While the lawsuit was pending, the town filed two more criminal actions against her. After pleading not guilty in the criminal trials, Martinson was tried and convicted. The trial court in the criminal trial ordered the town to specify in writing what Martinson had to remove to bring her property into compliance. In the civil trial, the town asked the court to declare Martinson was violat- ing the ordinance and to order her to cease any and all activities that violated the ordinance. It pointed out it had warned Martinson to abate the violations and said she had been twice convicted of violating the junkyard ordinance. While the lawsuit was pending, Martinson got license plates for some of the cars on the property, leaving only. two unlicensed. The court denied the town's request. It found Martinson didn't have enough junk vehicles to qualify as a junkyard because she now had only two unli- censed vehicles on her property. It also found the ordinance provisions regarding miscellaneous material on her property was unconstitutional because it didn't give her any notice as to what she needed to do to comply with the ordinance. The town appealed}'arguing Martinson clearly knew what the ordinance