Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/1999

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Z.B. March 10, 1999 -- Page 5 . meant'because she had twice pleaded guilty to violating the ordinance and had twice been convicted of violating it. DECISION: Affirmed. The town wasn't entitled to an order prohibiting Martinson from violating the ordinance. Martinson no longer had enough junk vehicles to qualify her property as a junkyard and the provisions relating to the salvaging or scaveng- ing of goods were unconstitutionally vague. Martinson wasn't violating the provisions relating to junk vehicles. While the lawsuit was pending, she had gotten license plates for vehicles on her prop- erty so that she had no more than two unlicensed vehicles. Although some of the licensed vehicles were inoperable and would have otherwise classified as junk vehicles, the ordinance stated a vehicle wasn't a junk vehicle if it had a current license plate. The trial court properly concluded the prohibitions against the "salvaging or scavenging of goods" were too vague to be enforced. Those terms weren't defined by the ordinance, and the common meaning -- "rescuing or saving usable materials from discarded material or rubbish" m was too vague be- cause it didn't give Martinson 'any way to determine whether she was rescuing or saving items on her property. Mar.tinson clearly had a lot of "stuff" in her yard, but the town never told her how the stuff in her yard violated the ordi- nance or which stuff constituted a violation. The court couldn't order Martinson to comply with the ordinance without telling her what she had to do to comply. In fact, Martinson wasn't doing anything with the stuff in her yard other than allowing it to deteriorate. That Martinson twice pleaded guilty and was twice convicted of violating the ordinance didn't save the town's case. Martinson never challenged the va- lidity of the ordinance in the criminal cases, and it wasn't clear whether she knew what the ordinance required of her or whether she pleaded guilty for some other reason. Moreover, the criminal court specifically ordered the town to notify Martinson in writing what ghe had to remove, which indicated the town had never told Martinson what was expected of her. see also: Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 E2d 26 (1980). see also: Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94S. Ct. J242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). Variance --Access to industrial 'facilities can't be within 100 feet of residential district Citation: Czikowsky v. Lebanon Zoning Board, Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New London, No. 112887 (1999) Marty Gilman Inc. wanted to buy property in the town of Lebanon, Conn. It intended to use the property for industrial or manufacturing use. The company applied to the town zoning commission to rezone the prop- erty from residential/agricultural to light industry. The commission granted the zoning change, which was upheld by a court.