Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/1999

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Page 4 -- February 25, 1999 Z.B. The county claimed courts always had the authority to issue such orders to correct zoning violations. DECISION: Affirmed. Mueller had to either remove or license and insure all of the junk vehicles, or pay the greater fine. There was more than enough evidence for the trial court to find Mueller guilty of operating a salvage yard on his property. The zoning administrator saw 41 junk vehicles on the property and said Muellei~ admitted he sold parts from these cars. Mueller admitted many of the cars couldn't be used on a pub- lic road and admitted he planned to trade car parts from the cars. Moreover, most of the cars were unlicensed and uninsured. This was enough for the trial court to reasonably find the cars were unfit for the purpose for which they were made in common terms, they were junk or salvage vehicles. Given the large number of cars that were inoperable and the fact that Mueller sold their parts, it was reasonable to conclude the cars were there for commercial purposes. Ordering Mueller to either remove or license and insure the vehicles was well within the court's discretion i'nabating the code violations. The court prop- erly fashioned a reasonable remedy for Mueller to avoid paying the substan- tially greater fine. If Mueller didn't want to license' and insure the vehicles, he was free to leave the junk cars on the property and pay the greater fine m but he would face new charges of violating !he.county's land use ordinance. see also: Forest County v. G° ode, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998). see also:. Mentzel v. City of Oshkosh, 432 N. W.2d 609 (1988). Variance w Owner claims 'hardship' in having to walk 15 feet to shower after swimming Citation: Kelley v. CIackamas County, .Court of Appeals of Oregon, No. CA A 104016 (1999) Kelley owned a house in Clackamas County, Ore. He wanted to build a poolhouse near the pool in his front yard, but he couldn't build the poolhouse where he wanted it without violating the county's frontyard setback. Kelley applied for a setback variance, claiming a hardship because there was no other reasonable place to build a poolhouse in which people could change and shower after using his pool. The county zoning ordinance allowed a variance if complying with zoning regulations "would create a hardship due to one or more" of four specified conditions,' one of which was the physical characteristics of the property or improvements that weren't typical of the area. The county denied Kelley's variance request. The hearing officer said Kelley didn't suffer the necessary "hardship" even though his need for a variance was based on the "physical characteristics and improvements" of his property. Ac- cording to the hearing officer, any inconvenience pool users suffered by hav- ing to walk 15 feet to Kelley's house to shower or change didn't amount to a hardship. The hearing officer also noted that other swimming pools in the area