Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/1999

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Z.B. February 25, 1999 -- Page 5 didn't have separate poolhouses. Kelley appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals, arguing he established the necessary hardship by meeting one of the zoning ordinance's four criteria for a variance. The county argued that the zoning ordinance allowed a variance only if one of the four criteria was present and the condition resulted in a hardship. The board agreed with Kelley and reversed the county's decision. Accord- ing to the board, the ordinance didn't provide any basis for the county to evalu- ate Kelley's hardship beyond application of the four listed criteria. The board said those criteria described four conditions any one of which could consti- tute a hardship -- and that because the hearing officer found at least one of those criteria was satisfied, he had no choice but to issue Kelley a variance. The county appealed. DECISION: Reversed and returned to the board. The board improperly reversed the hearing officer's decision. Kelley failed to prove a hardship merely by showing the characteristics of his land and its improvements prevented him from building the poolhouse in compliance with the setback requirements, r~ The county's interpretation of the ordinance made more sense than did the board's. The Ordinance referredto a "hardship due to one or more of the [four] conditions," which indicated the necessary "hardship" was something separate from and a result of the conditions, as.opposed to being embodied in or defined by the conditions. As the county claimed, the board's and Kelley's interpreta- tion would make the word "hardship'.' unnecessary; the ordinance could have providerl-foPa variance if any-o.f-the~four conditions "existed" or was "present." Finally, the only consequence of Kelley's inability to build a poolhouse within the setback area was that instead of having a separate poolhouse, Kelley and anyone else who used the pool would have to "navigate.the 15-foot dis- tance from his house to the pool" to shower -- hardly a "hardship." see also: Bienz v. City of Dayton, 566 P. 2d 904 (1977). see also: Lovell v. Independence Pla~ming Commission, 586 P. 2d 99 (1978). Special Use m Did sunset clause prohibit developer from completing project? Citation: Hills of Btmker Lake Ho~,ieowners v. City of Andover, Court of Appeals of Minn. esota, No. C7-98-1651 (1999) A developer proposed building a grocery store and gas station in the city of Andover, Minn. It applied for a special use permit to install gas, motor fuel, and propane tanks in connection with its proposed development. The developer's property was in a neighborhood business district. The city planning commission reviewed the proposed location and the number of park- ing stalls and square-footage requirement and recommended approving the request. The city council considered the commission's recommendation along