Laserfiche WebLink
z.g. <br /> <br />August 10, 1999 -- Page 3 <br /> <br />focusing on the consumption of alcohol and other alleged problems associated <br />with dancing were unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The town <br />wasn't trying to stop people from dancing, it was trying to limit problems asso- <br />ciated with dancing. <br /> The problem with the town's ordinance was that it wasn't merely an inci- <br />dental restriction on First Amendment freedoms, and it certainly wasn't "no <br />greater than is essential" to the town's professed interest in regulating alcohol. <br />Although the town claimed it passed the ordinance because of the drinking <br />associated with dances, the ordinance wasn't limited to places where alcohol <br />was consumed. The town could draft a much narrower ordinance aimed at <br />controlling the perceived evils associated with dancing because the ordinance <br />as written prohibited even a performance of The Nutcracker ballet without the <br />town's approval. <br /> The town's permitting scheme was also an unconstitutional prior restraint <br />oil free speech because it placed "unbridled discretion in the hands of a govern- <br />ment official." Any law that subjected a First Amendment freedom to the prior <br />restraint of a license without narrow, objective, and definite standards was un- <br />constitutional. In this case, the criteria guiding the town council were vague <br />and amorphous, focusing on the "moral character" of the person applying for <br />tile permit and allowing revocation for "improper conduct." There was no way <br />for a court to determine what was proper or improper under the ordinance. <br /> <br />Elam v. Bolling, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Big <br />Stone Gap Div., No. 98-203~B (1999). <br /> <br />see also: City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed. 2d <br />18 (1989). <br /> <br />see also: United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed. 2d <br />6 72 (1968). <br /> <br />Home Occupation -- City says front-yard anchor illegally advertises home <br />business <br /> <br />OHIO (7/14/99) -- The Houghtalings owned a travel business called Pleasure <br />Cruises that booked its clients on cruise ship vacations. The Houghtalings ran <br />the business out of their home. The business qualified as a "home occupation" <br />under the city code. <br /> In ].997, the Houghtalings put a metal replica of an anchor on their front <br />lawn. The anchor was 7 feet 6 inches high and had a 6-foot-long crossbar. <br /> The city ordinance that regulated home occupations stated "no sign, adver- <br />tising the home occupation, will be permitted." The ordinance defined "sign" <br />to mean any structure or natural object, including trees, rocks, bushes, or the <br />ground itself, "used to attract attention to any product, place, activity, person, <br />or business." <br /> The city planning director told the Houghtalings to remove the anchor' <br /> <br /> <br />