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Page 4- August 10, 1999 Z.B. <br /> <br />/34- <br /> <br /> because it violated the city ordinance that regulated home occupations. <br /> cording to the planning director, the anchor was a sign advertising their home <br /> business. Apparently in response, the Houghtalings hung lights from each end <br /> of the anchor's crossbar. <br /> The Houghtalings appealed the planning director's order to the city board, <br /> claiming the anchor wasn't a sign. They also asked for a variance if the board <br /> determined the anchor was, in fact, a sign. The board found the anchor was a <br /> sign and denied the Houghtalings' request for a variance. It ordered the <br /> Houghtalings to remove the anchor. <br /> The Houghtalings appealed to court, claiming the anchor wasn't a sign <br /> because it had no markings informing the public of the name or telephone <br /> number of Pleasure Cruises. <br /> The city claimed the anchor was a prohibited home-occupation sign be- <br /> cause the Houghtalings used it to attract attention to their business. It showed <br /> the I-loughtalings used the anchor as a reference point for people who came to <br /> their home to pick up tickets, by telling clients to look for the anchor. One <br /> witness said the presence of a large anchor on one's lawn indicated some nau- <br /> tical connection. Several witnesses said they thbught the anchor advertised <br /> Pleasure Cruises, but each knew about the business and what services it provided. <br /> The court reversed the board's decision, finding the anchor wasn't a sign. <br /> According to the court, the anchor needed wording or something else clearly <br /> associated with cruises for it to be considered a sign. <br /> The city appealed. It claimed the court improperly found the anchor needed <br /> wording or something else associated with cruises to be considered a sign be- <br /> cause the zoning ordinance had no such requirement. <br /> <br /> DECISION: Affirmed. <br /> The Houghtalings could keep the anchor. <br /> Whether the Houghtalings' anchor met the definition of a "sign" was irrel- <br />evant. Even if the anchor was a sign, it didn't advertise the Houghtalings' home <br />business -- and the ordinance prohibited signs that advertised home businesses. <br /> The ordinance didn't define "advertise," so the court used a legal dictionary's <br />definition: "to advise, announce, apprise, command, given notice of, inform, <br />make known" or "to calf a matter to the public attention by any means whatso- <br />ever.'' There were no words or markings on the anchor that announced the name or <br />phone number of Pleasure Cruises. ~though several witnesses said they thought <br />the anchor advertised Pleasure Cruises, they all knew about the business be- <br />fore seeing the anchor. There ~vas nothing on or about the anchor itself that <br />declared to the public at large, who didn't know about Pleasure Cruises, that a <br />business that sold cruise ship vacations was run out of the Houghtalings' house. <br /> <br />Houghtaling v. City of Medina Board of Zo~?ing Appeals, Court of Ap£eals of <br />Ohio, 9th Appellate Dist., Medina Cout~ty, No. 2896-M (2999).' <br /> <br />see also: Ohio Departme~t of Health v. Sowald, 603 N.E.2d l_OJ 7 (~992). <br />see also: Smith v. Granville Township Board of Trustees, 693 N. E. 2d 219 (1999). <br /> <br /> <br />