Laserfiche WebLink
Page 2. L September t0, t999 Z.B. <br /> <br /> First Amendment -- City prohibits political signs except for short period <br /> before elections <br /> OHIO (8/13/99) -- Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A. was a law firm in <br /> Painesville. The city building inspector notified the firm that a political sign on <br /> its property violated a city ordinance that prohibited all political signs except <br /> for a 17-day period before an election. Two days later, when the building inspector <br /> asked why the sign was still there, the firm said it didn't want the sign removed. <br /> The building inspector filed a criminal complaint against the law fn-rn, claim- <br /> ing it violated the zoning ordinance. The building inspector noted a separate <br /> offense occurred every day the sign remained on the property. <br /> The firm asked the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing the zoning <br />ordinance violated its First Amendment right to free speech. It argued the <br />ordinance was an improper content-based regulation that sought to regulate <br />free speech, pointing out the ordinance didn't prohibit other temporary signs <br />such' as "For Sale" or real estate signs. <br /> The city claimed the ordinance was a legitimate "content neutral" regula- <br />tion because it treated equally ail political speech, regardless of the message <br />conveyed. It argued political signs sprang up like weeds during an election <br />and were a traffic hazard because they were designed to divert drivers' atten- <br />tion from the road. According to the city, the signs shouldn't be considered <br />"political speech" because, they didn't contain policy, statements or information <br />about ballot issues. It said the signs were used solely to create name recognition <br />and candidates could use leaflets to address the issues. <br /> The court refused to dismiss the charge, and the firm changed its plea to no <br />contest. The court found the firm guilty and fined it $250 plus court costs. <br /> The law firm appealed. <br /> <br />DECISION: Reversed, <br /> The ordinance was unconstitutional. <br /> The city could place 'reasonable' "time, place, or manner" restrictions on <br />protected speech, but the city's regulation wasn't content neutral. The First <br />Amendment protected not only particular viewpoints, but also public discus- <br />sion of an entire topic. Except during a limited window of time, the city banned <br />the use of all political signs, which were an important and sometimes indis- <br />pensable means of communication. <br /> To justify 'suppressing protected speech, the city needed "reasonable <br />grounds to fear that serious evil will result." The city's only justifications <br />were aesthetics and traffic safety, which weren't enough -- it made no at- <br />tempt to show the "disease sought to be cured." Moreover, even if aesthetic <br />and traffic issues were important enough to warrant limiting political speech, <br />the city didn't show the ban was the least restrictive way to combat the problems. <br />Citation: City of Painesville Building Department v. Dworken & Bernstein <br />Co., L.P.4., Court of Appeals of Ohio, 1Jth Appellate Dist., Lake County, No. <br />98-L-223 (1999). <br /> <br /> <br />