Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/06/1997

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1 z.g. April 10, 1997 -- Page 5 I I I I I I i I I I I I I I ! I I I residential, and therefore could not be restricted to commercial activity. see also: Isaacs v. Wilkes-Barre City Zoning Hearing Board, 612 A.2d 559. see also: Jacquelin v. Zoning Hearing Board of Hatboro Borough, 558 A.2d 189 (1989). Special Use Permit-- Did city's delay in granting permit constitute taking? Mandelstam v. City of South Miami, 685 So. 2d 868 (Florida) 1996 The Mandelstams bought a parcel of land in South Miami, Fla., where they wanted to build a gymnastics school. In that area, the zoning ordinance allowed for both public and private schools. The Mandelstams applied for a special use permit, which the city commission denied, saying the ordinance's definition of a "school" did not include gymnastics schools. After a court affirmed the city commission's denial of the permit, the Mandelstams appealed. The appeals court ordered the city to grant them the permit, which the city did, attaching to the permit a number of conditions. When the Mandelstams submitted the final site plan, it contained a number of changes from the original proposal. The city rejected the plan, saying it didn't allow for adequate parking. The lower court found the Mandelstams complied with code requirements and ordered the city to approve their plan. It also issued sanctions to the city for failing to meet a court-imposed deadline. During this process, the city's vice mayor allegedly asked the city not to support the Mandelstams' permit request. However, the city planner apparently advised the board to issue the permit. The Mandelstams sued the city and the vice mayor, claiming the city's delay and the vice mayor's actions resulted in a temporary taking of their property. They also claimed the delay resulted in an inverse condemnation of their property and violated their due-process rights. In addition, they argued the vice mayor was not entitled to qualified immunity, because immunity did not protect public officials who acted with malice or contrary to the law. The city asked for and was granted judgment without a trial. The Mandelstams appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The prolonged litigation did not entitle the Mandelstams to a trial. Delays in the permit-seeking process were to be expected, so the delay in the Mandelstams' case did not result in a taking. Accordingly, the Mandelstams could not support their claims of inverse condemnztion and due-process violations. As for the vice mayor's role in the situation, the Mandelstams were correct on one argument -- that qualified immunity could not be extended to public officials who acted with malice or contrary to the law. However, they failed to establish that the vice mayordid act either with malice or without respect to the law, so the vice mayor was entitled to qualified immunity. Even if she did attempt