Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/06/1997

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Page 6 -- April 10, 1997 Z,B, to derail the Mandelstams' plans, it apparently didn't have much effect -- the city planner recommended the permit anyway. see also: Espa~ola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F. 2d 827 (J982). see also: Jacobi v. City of Miami Beac& 678 So. 2d 1365 (J996). Ordinance -- Landowner fights amendment to zoning ordinance Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 479 S.E. 2d 221 (North Carolh~a) J997 Hunt owned 150 acres of undeveloped land in the town of Chapel Hill, N.C. The town zoned the land to allow three homes to be built on every acre. The town amended its zoning ordinance. The amendment lowered the number of homes that could be built on 145 acres of Hunt's land. Now only one home could be built for every five acres. Before the amendment, Hunt's land was worth $3 million. After the amendment, Hunt claimed he could not sell homes for more than it cost to build them. However, Hunt never filed a development plan or requested a variance from the ordinance. Hunt and Messer, who had interest in Hunt's land, sued the town. The town asked the court to dismiss the suit, which the court did. Messer and Hunt appealed. They claimed the zoning amendment was a taking without just compensation and an improper use of police power. Messer and Hunt also argued the amendment was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. DECISION: Affirmed. The court properly dismissed Messer and Hunt's claims because they presented no conflict to resolve. Because Hunt never filed a development plan or asked for a variance, there was no evidence about how the amendment would ultimately impact Hunt's land. Without this evidence, the court could not decide whether a taking occurred. Regulating land was within the town's police power. However, because there was no evidence about how the amendment actually affected Hunt's land, the court could not determine whether the zoning amendment was an improper exercise of that police power. The zoning ordinance amendment was reasonably related to the promotion of the public good. Therefore, the amendment would be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable only if the harm to Hunt was greater than the amendment's purpose. Because Hunt never filed a development plan or asked for a variance, there was no evidence the amendment would affect Hunt's land, so the court could not decide what Hunt's harm was. see also: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. JO03, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed. 2d 798 (]992). see also: Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. J72, ]05 S. Ct. 3]08, 87 L.Ed. 2d ]26 (J985). I I I I I ! I i I I I ! I I ! I I