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' someone who will be affected by the decision. Although this <br /> relationship may not involve a financial conflict of interest, <br /> courts recognize that the associational interest may just as <br /> improperly bias the zoning o~fficial's decision. <br /> Although the evidence is generally circumstantial that a zoning <br /> official's familial, business, or other relationship actually has <br /> caused a biased decision, an appearance of unfairness is usually <br /> evident. Courts applying this ~tandard will invalidate decisions <br /> when an associational interest, raises the specter of impropriety. <br /> As with other types of potential conflicts of interest, the <br /> courts must weigh the evidence tO determine whether the <br /> associational conflict is great-enough to justify invalidating the <br /> zoning decision. They will generally examine the nature of both <br /> the association and the underlying interest to determine <br /> whether it warrants invalidation. Generally, the underlying <br /> interest has a greater impact on the court's determination of the <br /> issue of impartiality, but a close personal relationship may <br /> indicate just as strong a propensity toward bias. <br /> Close family relationships, are usually subject to greater <br /> judicial scrutiny. More distant familial relationships are <br /> generally tolerated, although the nature of the underlying <br /> interest may justify invalidating the zoning decision. <br /> The potential for bias also may exist because of a zoning <br /> official's relationship to various community organizations, <br /> although the nature of the underlying interest is usually the <br /> determining factor. For instance, courts have found that mere <br /> membership in a church that has an interest in proceedings <br /> before the zoning body is not enough to warrant invalidating a <br /> zoning decision without evidence of actual bias. <br /> Prejudice and Bias. This Category is generally based on <br /> statements made by a zoning official that reflect a prejudgment <br /> of the merits of a particular ZOning application. If the landowner <br /> can prove that the zoning de~:ision maker was somehow <br /> predisposed to decide his application in a certain way, a court <br /> may choose to invalidate the.decision. However, a zoning <br /> official's particular political V. iew or general opinion on a given <br /> issue will generally not suffice to show bias. <br /> <br /> Courts recognize that public officials have opinions like <br />everyone else and inevitably hold certain political views <br />related to their public office. In fact, zoning officials are <br />typically chosen to serve in their official capacity because <br />they are expected to represent certain views about local land- <br />use plan_ning and development. For instance, a zoning official <br />may have campaigned for office on a pro- or <br />antidevelopment stance. The courts tolerate this type of <br />opinion because it is part of the political process. Moreover, <br />official oPinions concerning land development generally <br />represent community values and preferences that may <br />implicate important public welfare concerns. <br /> Only when the opinion rises to a level of personal or self- <br />interest or shows prejudgment of a specific situation is the right <br />to an impartial decision violated. This might occur ifa zoning <br />official made statements prior to or outside of the ordinary <br />decision-making process that indicated a strong presentiment <br />about the decision. Whether a particular statement would be <br />strong enough evidence of bias is a fact-based determination for <br />the courts. In one case, a Rhode Island court found sufficient <br />evidence of bias when a zoning board member told opponents <br />of a variance application prior to the hearing that "we are going <br />to shove it down your throat." [Barbara Real{y Co. v. Zoning <br />Board, 128 A.2d 342, 343 (R.I. 1957).] <br /> Ex Parte Contacts. Proof of ex parte contacts may also show <br />that a zoning decision was tainted by bias, although the courts <br />may tolerate this as a part of the political process. Ex parte <br />contacts--discussions of a topic outside official proceedings-- <br />frequently occur through lobbying efforts by various interest <br />groups seeking to influence the decisions of public officials. In <br />the context of quasi-legislative decisions, such as rezonings, the <br />courts are especially reluctant to scrutinize ex parte lobbying <br />efforts becauie of the separation of powers and First Amendment <br />rights to influence the political process. However, when ex parte <br />contacts are present in the context of quasi-judicial zoning <br />decisions, such as variances and special use permits, courts will be <br />more receptive to challenges on grounds of zoning bias. <br /> <br />Ga. Code Ann. q~ 8%953 Outing code of ethics for public <br /> officers and employees). ~ <br />Idaho Code ~ 67-6501 (prohibits participadon by members of <br /> governing boards or committees in matters in which there is <br /> an economic interest by.self or by relations). <br />Idaho Code ~ 67-6506 (regulates the economic interest of <br /> members of the governing board, their relatives, employer, . <br /> and employees). <br />Ind. Code Ann. ~ 36-74-223, 36-7-4-909 (regulating <br /> planning commission and board of adjustment conflicts). <br />Md. Ann. Code art. 40A, ~3 3-101 (prohibits public officials <br /> from participating in matters in which they have a conflict of <br /> interest). <br />Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, 3 2251 (1) (prohibits direct and <br /> indirect pecuniary interest). <br />Mo. Ann. Stat. § 105.462 (prohibits participation by <br /> member where decision may result in direct financial gain <br /> or loss to him) <br />Mont. Code Ann. ~ 2-2-125(b) (prohibits an officer or <br /> employee of local government from participating in <br /> official acts in which he has a direct and substantial <br /> financial interest). <br /> <br />N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ~ 673.14 (regulating zoning board of <br /> adjustment, building code board, planning board, or historic <br /> district commission conflicts of interest). <br />N.J. Star. Ann. § 40-55D-23(b) (regulating planning board <br /> conflicts of interest). <br />N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-10-5 (any member of a governing board <br /> having any possible financial interest in any policy or decision <br /> is required to disclose matters). <br />N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law ~ 800-809 (prohibiting conflicts of <br /> interest of municipal officers and employees). <br />Ore. Rev. Stat. c~ 244.120(1)(a) (requiring elected public <br /> officials 'other than legislators to announce potential conflicts <br /> prior to acting thereon). <br />ILl. Gen. Laws § 36-14-4 (prohibits participation when there is <br /> a ~substantial conflict of interest'). <br />S.C. Code Ann. ~) 8-1.3-410 (no municipal official or employee <br /> shall use his/her position for financial gain). <br />Va. Code Ann. ~ 2.1-639.1 (state and local government <br /> conflict-of-interest act). <br />Wis. Stat. Ann..~ 19.46 (no public official shall take official <br /> action on any matter in which he/she has a substantial <br /> financial interest). <br /> <br /> <br />