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A biased decision maker's participation in the actual vote on a zoning application is not necessary for invalidation. A biased zoning official may disqualify herself from voting, and' the court will still invalidate the decision if it finds that she participated in the proceedings or otherwise influenced the zoning body's voting members. [See, for example. Szoke v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Monmouth Beach, 260 N,J. Super. 341,616 A.2d 942 (App. Div, 1992); Manookian v. Blaine County, I12 Idaho 697,735 P.2d 1008 (1987).] Likewise, the decision would be invalidated if the biased official voted, even though the zoning action would carry without the necessit-y of counting that vote. Further, courts may invalidate a zoning &cision even when the biased official is only a member of an advisory board that makes findings and recommendations to the zoning body that ultimately makes the decision [see Buell v. City of Bremerwn, 80 Wash. 2d 518,495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (biased planning board member participated in recommendation to city, council concerning zoning change)]. Courts have said that the self-interest of one official infects the action of the other members of the zoning body regardless of their disinterestedness. One court denounced a township supervisor's appearance before the zoning.board over which he had appointment powers as an imposition of duress on members of the decision-making body and a violation' of basic due process. The supervisor appeared on behalf ora variance applicant, [Abrahamson v. Wendell, 76 Mich. App. 278,256 N.W.2d 613 (1977).] Courts have developed a number of approaches and standards for evaluating problems of bias and conflicts in zoning decisions. These approaches var3, by state and take particular factual circumstances into account. Courts have articulated several tests or standards for addressing zoning bias. Many courts may use a combination or variation of more than one approach. Actual Bias. The actual bias standard is the most stringent test and distinguishes benveen situations where a clear benefit will be conferred on a zoning decision maker and instances when only a potential for benefit exists. Courts applying this approach require clear and tangible evidence of actual bias as opposed to the mere appearance of impropriety or the potential for partiality. Substantial Interest or Temptatior~ Under this standard, an aggrieved landowner must show more than a mere appearance of unfairness but need not prove the existence of "actual" bias. This standard is premised on the need to remove public officials from situations where a potential conflict of interest would have the capacity to tempt or improperly influence an official's decision. Under this test, direct and substantial interests provide grounds for disqualifying an official from participation in a zoning decision, whereas indirect or remote interests do not. Thus, the focus centers on the probabili~ that particular interests may affect the ultimate outcome of a zoning decision. Appearance of Unfairness. Some courts, in weighing evidence of potential bias, will disqualify an official and invalidate the zoning body's decisions if a mere appearance of unfairness exists. Courts using this lesser standard, most notably those in the state of Washington, emphasize the need for public perceptions of fairness and confidence in the zoning process. In virtually every zoning bias case, the courts will discuss the importance of the appearance of fairness in zoning decisions. Most courts will not,' however, rely on it as a separate standard Mark Dennison is a~ attorney and author w}~o practices environmental, land-use, and zoning law in Ridgewood, New Jersey. and will not hold that an appearance of unfairness alone suffices to invalidate a zoning decision. Instead, they will consider the appearance of fairness in combination with evidence of"actual bias" or "substantial interest or temptation." In this sense, th~ threat to public confidence in the zoning process is viewed as coterminous with actual or potential conflicts and operates as an additional rationale for regulating bias. Types of Bios or Conflict of Interest In applying their various approaches to determining bias and conflicts of interest in zoning decisions, the courts will review evidence of several relevant factors. The various types of zoning bias and conflicts of interest can be grouped into fairly distinct catego- ries, one or more of which determines ever), zoning bias case. Financial Influences. Financial interests represent the most prevalent type of conflict. 'When zoning decision makers stand to benefit financially from ruling in a certain way on a zoning application, the zoning official's failure to disqualify himself from participating in the decision clearly arouses an appearance of unfairness and may be evidence of actual bias or "substantial temptation," which may provide sufficient justification for the court to invalidate the zoning decision. Zoning decisions tainted by financial influences especially undermine public confidence in the process because this type of bias creates a strong impression of local government corruption and dealmaking. Courts have invalidated zoning decisions both in cases where a local official actually benefited and in situations where the decision maker could potentially benefit. Zoning decisions have been struck down when a zoning official stood to gain financially as a neighboring landowner, as an employee, as a business associate of an affected landowner, or as the seller or purchaser of property impacted by the zoning decision. The most obvious type of financial conflict arises when the zoning official's own property, will be affected financially by a proposed zoning change. Associational Interests..This type of bias arises in situations where a zoning official's impartiality may be compromised because she has a personal or business relationship with State Laws Regulating Zoning Conflicts of Interest Ada. Code ~ 11-43-54 (prohibits councilmen from deciding issues where special financial interest exists). /da. Code § 36-25 (code of ethics for alt governmental officials and employees), : · : Alaska Stat, § 29.20.010 (prohibits having a "substantial financial interest"). Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. ~ 11-222 (member of board ofcotmty supervisors shall not vote upon any measure in which he, any · member of his family, or his panner is pecuniarily interested). Ark. Stat. Ann. § 21-8-304 (public officials or state employees cannot use office to advance personal interests except incidental). Conn. Gen. 5tat. Ann. c~ 8-11 (prohibits participating when there is a direct or indirect, personal or financial interest). Fla. 5tat. Ann. § 112.3143 (requiring public officers to disclose interests within 15 days of vote). Ga. Code Ann. § 36-30-6 (illegal for a council member to vote on any matter in which he/she is personally interested). Ga. Code Ann. ~ 69-204 (prohibits participation when it concerns a matter "in which [the decision maker is] personally interested"),