My WebLink
|
Help
|
About
|
Sign Out
Home
Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2012
Ramsey
>
Public
>
Agendas
>
Planning Commission
>
2012
>
Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2012
Metadata
Thumbnails
Annotations
Entry Properties
Last modified
3/21/2025 10:10:54 AM
Creation date
4/2/2012 7:54:30 AM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Meetings
Meeting Document Type
Agenda
Meeting Type
Planning Commission
Document Date
04/05/2012
There are no annotations on this page.
Document management portal powered by Laserfiche WebLink 9 © 1998-2015
Laserfiche.
All rights reserved.
/
143
PDF
Print
Pages to print
Enter page numbers and/or page ranges separated by commas. For example, 1,3,5-12.
After downloading, print the document using a PDF reader (e.g. Adobe Reader).
View images
View plain text
Zoning Bulletin <br />February 25, 2012 J Volume 6 J No, 4 <br />noted that the statute expressly indicates that ' [a]fter entry of judgment <br />in the circuit court in the action in review, any party to the cause may <br />prosecute an appeal to the appellate court ...." Again, since Kennedy <br />was not a party to the cause the circuit court case the court conclud- <br />ed that she could not prosecute an appeal. <br />Kennedy, however, argued that she still had standing despite her non- <br />party status. First, she contended that § 536.100 of the Missouri Admin- <br />istrative Procedures Act expressly conferred standing upon her as a "per- <br />son ... aggrieved by a .final decision in a contested case." Second, she ar- <br />gued that even if she did not having standing under § 536.100, the City's <br />standing should be deemed to have transferred to her for purposes of ap- <br />peal once the City acted in an allegedly arbitrary and capricious manner <br />in choosing not to pursue the appeal. The court rejected both arguments. <br />The court found that § 536.100 did not confer standing to nonpar- <br />ties on appeal in the appellate courts. Rather, § 64.660.2 provided the <br />mechanism for judicial review here. Again, that section conferred stand- <br />ing only upon parties to the cause of which Kennedy was not one. <br />The court also concluded that standing could not automatically trans- <br />fer from a named party (e.g., here, the City) to a nonparty (e.g., here, <br />Kennedy) for purposes of appeal. Kennedy had argued that she would <br />have been unable to intervene in the circuit court case because the City <br />was adequately representing her interests. As such, she contended that <br />it was not until the City decided not to pursue the appeal that their in- <br />terests diverged. The court rejected that argument as speculative. More- <br />over, the court found that, had she tried, Kennedy would not have been <br />precluded from seeking permissive intervention ( "which does not involve <br />the question of adequate representation") to become a party to the litiga- <br />tion, and thereby acquire standing to appeal the circuit court's judgment. <br />See also: F. Disposal South, LLC v. St. Louis County Council, 266 <br />S. Wad 334 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2008). <br />See also: City of Bridgeton v. Norfolk & W Ry. Co., 535 S. W.2d 99 <br />(Mo. 1976). <br />Case Note: This case makes clear that opponents of land use re- <br />quests should intervene in any original court action rather than re- <br />lying on the municipality to represent their interests. Otherwise, as <br />was the case with Kennedy here, they lose all opportunity to chal- <br />lenge the matter, and risk. a municipality's decision to deny a land <br />use request being overturned without further appeal. <br />© 2012 Thomson Reuters 9 <br />
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.