Agenda - Planning Commission - 10/04/2012

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Zoning Bulletin July 25, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 14 with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-295.6(d) due to its proximity to a national wildlife refuge and state -park. Waste Industries brought suit against the State of North Carolina and DENR (hereinafter, collectively "the State"). Waste Industries alleged that 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 543 and ch. 550 (the "Statute") violated the United States Con- stitution and the State Constitution on various grounds and deprived Waste Industries of their common law vested rights. Among other things, Waste Industries alleged that: (1) the statute had a discriminatory purpose against out-of-state waste in violation of the Commerce Clause in that its purpose was to block out-of-state waste from entering the state; (2) the statute had prohibited discriminatory effects under the Commerce Clause evidenced by the nonconstruction of four proposed landfills which were intended to accept out-of-state waste; (3) the statute violated the Commerce Clause because it had incidental effects on interstate commerce in that it resulted in increased costs for waste disposal; and (4) the statute violated the Contract Clause because it "substantially impair[ed]" Waste Industries' franchise agreement with the county (North Carolina statutory law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-294(b) required Waste Industries to obtain a franchise agreement from the county prior to applying for a permit to operate a solid waste facility in the state). All parties moved for summary judgment, asking the court to find there were no material issues of fact in dispute and to decide the matter in their favor based on the law alone. The trial court entered an order denying Waste Industries' motion for summary judgment and granting the State's motion for summary judgment. Waste Industries appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that: (1) the statute did not have a discriminatory purpose against out-of-state waste in violation of the Commerce Clause; (2) the statute did not have prohibited discriminatory ef- fects under the Commerce Clause; (3) the statute did not violate the Com- merce Clause based on any incidental effect on interstate commerce; and (4) the statute did not violate the Contract Clause. In evaluating whether the statute had a discriminatory purpose in violation of the Commerce Clause, the court said that it must "assume that the objec- tives articulated by the legislature are actual purposes of the statute, unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to conclude that they could not have been a goal of the legislation." The court found that none of the purposes articulated by the General Assembly suggested a purpose of discriminating against out-of-state waste. Rather, the court found that the state had a history of concern about the disposal of waste in landfills regardless of source. The court also found no evidence that the General Assembly, in adopting the stat- ute, was motivated by an intent of discriminating against interstate commerce by blocking out-of-state waste from entering the state. Although Waste Industries' CEO had claimed that "certain legislators had reported to him that other unidentified legislators wanted to block the importing of out-of-state waste," the court rejected them as evidence of a discriminatory intent, noting they: were secondhand statements; not part of any legislative history; and not part of any other official reporting of legislators' positions and views. ©2012 Thomson Reuters 7