Agenda - Planning Commission - 10/04/2012

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July 25, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 14 Zoning Bulletin Waste Industries had argued that, in any case, the statute had prohibited discriminatory effects in violation of the Commerce Clause evidenced by the nonconstruction of four proposed landfills that were intended to accept out-of- state waste. The court disagreed. The court found the buffer, height, area, and capacity limitations of the statute did not distinguish between in -state and out- of-state waste. Also, the court found out-of-state waste could still continue to come into the state because existing landfills could expand or new landfills could be built in compliance with the challenged regulations. Waste Industries had also argued that the statute violated the Commerce Clause because it had the incidental effect on interstate commerce of increas- ing costs for waste disposal. The court said that where a statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld against a commerce clause challenge; it will only be found to be unconstitutional if the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Here, the court found the Statute effectuated legitimate local public interests of the following benefits: environmental; public health; environmental justice; and financial security. Also, the court found that Waste Industries failed to provide evidence that any related burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighed those benefits. As to Waste Industries' Contract Clause violation argument, the court explained: "Whether a change in state law is an impairment of contract in violation of the Contract Clause 'has three components': (1) whether there is a contractual relationship; (2) whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship; and (3) whether the impairment is substantial." The court found there was no dispute in this case that a contract existed. As for the second ele- ment, the court found the statute did not retroactively alter any rights of Waste Industries or the county under the franchise agreement or change either party's obligations. The franchise agreement did not grant plaintiffs a right to build or operate a landfill, but rather simply made it possible for plaintiffs to apply to the state for a permit allowing them to build and operate the landfill. Indeed, the agreement anticipated that a permit might be denied or as happened here —the law governing landfills might be changed. See also: Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 15 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1473, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20070 (1981). See also: United Haulers Ass 'n, Inc. v. Oneida -Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 167 L. Ed. 2d 655, 64 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1129, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 601 (2007). See also: General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 112 S. Ct. 1105, 117 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1992). Case Note: Waste Industries had also contended that they had a common law vested right and, therefore, were entitled to have the law applied to their landfill project as it existed before the change in the statutes. (In 2004, Waste Industries had first submitted a site study to DENR, as required by law, in order to obtain a sanitary landfill permit.) The 8 © 2012 Thomson Reuters