Agenda - Planning Commission - 10/04/2012

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August 10, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 15 Zoning Bulletin The Airport Authority filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in superior court. Among other things, it asked the court to declare that the Airport Authority had exclusive jurisdiction over the zoning at the airport. Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Authority. The Town appealed. On appeal, the Town and the Airport Authority each argued they had exclusive zoning jurisdiction over the airport, citing pertinent state statutes. The Town noted that the Indiana Code's leading provisions granting gen- eral zoning authority over a relevant geographic area assign that authority to "units" of local government and specifically define a "unit" as a county, municipality, or township, not including specialized entities like airport authorities. (Ind. Code § 36-1-2-23.) The Town maintained that because it had adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance pursuant to the processes the Code prescribed, and because the airport lay within the Town's geographic boundaries, the Town had sole zoning jurisdiction over the airport. (Ind. Code § 36-7-4-601.) In response, the Airport Authority contended that it had separate statutory authority to exercise zoning jurisdiction over the airport. It cited the Code's list of powers for an airport authority. (Ind. Code § 8-22-3-11.) One of the powers on the list is that the Authority may "fix and determine exclusively the uses to which the airport lands may be put." (Ind. Code § 8-22-3-11(16)) (hereinafter "Subsection 16"). The Airport Authority reasoned that the power to control "the uses" of airport property included the power to control the zon- ing of airport property. DECISION: Reversed. The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that the Town, not the Airport Author- ity, had zoning jurisdiction over the airport. In so holding, the court observed that cities and towns could develop a comprehensive land use plan that was broad -reaching. The court recognized that "the general power to regulate zoning does not specifically include the power to require that other political subdivisions comply with zoning regulations." The court also noted that "a survey of other statutes granting lo- cal authority to perform and regulate government functions shows that none of the powers delegated to government units contain explicit authority to require compliance by another political subdivision. Thus, while [units] may `regulate the use of public ways,' Ind. Code § 36-9-2-7, no specific authorization is given to enforce such regulation on any other political subdivision." However, said the court, strict interpretation of the limitation that a unit may not impose a duty on a political subdivision without express statutory authority would lead to . . . absurdity" (i.e., inability to enforce speed zones on city employ- ees, or environmental regulations on counties). So, concluded the court, while the Town had broad zoning authority over the airport, it did not mean that the Town had absolute power to enforce its zoning requirements against the Airport Authority. Rather, the Airport Author- ity "must be allowed to seek relief under some circumstances [but] must . . 8 ©2012 Thomson Reuters