Agenda - Planning Commission - 10/04/2012

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Zoning Bulletin August 10, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 15 bear the burden [of showing] that . . . [such relief] is necessary to advance the governmental ends it seeks." If the Town denied such a request, the Airport authority could appeal to the courts, which would "balance the interests to determine which must prevail." As for the Airport Authority's argument that subsection 16 gave it zoning jurisdiction over the airport because it authorized the Airport Authority to "fix and determine exclusively the uses," the court found subsection 16 actually "cut[] against the Authority's position." The court found that subsection 16 did not give the Airport Authority zoning jurisdiction over the airport. The legislature had elsewhere given airport authorities actual zoning authority be- yond the boundaries of their own property to the extent that it was necessary to assure safe descent and ascent of aircraft. Thus, when the legislature desired to grant airport authorities zoning powers, it did so in § 14(d) and did not do so in subsection 16. In other words, the court deteniuned that if the legislature had intended to grant the Airport Authority sole zoning jurisdiction over the airport, it would have done so. The court concluded that subsection 16 did not prevail over the general zoning powers of the Town. See also: City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684 (Ind. 1987). Case Note: In its decision, the court noted that there were "a host of specialized local government entities authorized under Indiana law" which have "enumerated powers [that are] often read as rather robust in order to portray a sufficient picture of independence to warrant avoidance of the municipal debt limitations [under the Indiana Constitution]." Thus, the legal claim of exclusive power advanced by the Airport Authority was one that, the court recognized, "could be deployed by any number of other local governmental entities." Case Note: The court also concluded that covenants governing uses at the airport, which the Airport Authority's predecessor (Hamilton County) had executed with Boone County in exchange for Boone County's creation of a special airport zoning district, were not rendered invalid by the creation of the Airport Authority and the passage of ownership from Hamilton County to the Airport Authority —at least not by the grounds espoused by the Airport Authority (which were that Subsection 16 gave the Airport exclusive zoning jurisdiction), which the court had rejected. ©2012 Thomson Reuters 9