Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/04/2013

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Zoning Bulletin February 25, 20131 Volume 71 Issue 4 the County's urban center ordinances ultra vires (i.e., "beyond the pow- ers" of the County) and /or void and thereby incapable of supporting vested rights. The County and BSRE maintained that BSRE had a vested right to have its development permit applications processed under the urban center designation and development regulations in effect at the time of the filing— despite the fact that the Growth Board later deteinrined the regulations had been partly adopted in violation of SEPA. The superior court agreed with Woodway and SRB. Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Woodway and SRB. The County and BSRE appealed. DECISION: Judgment of superior court reversed, and matter remanded. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, agreed with the County and BSRE. It held that BSRE's development permit applications vested to the County's urban center regulations at the time the applica- tion was filed, despite the Growth Board's later determination that the County did not fully comply with SEPA in developing the regulations. In so holding, the court reviewed both Washington's rule on vested rights and the "invalidity provision" of the GMA. The court explained that Washington's rule on vested rights entitles developers to have a land development proposal processed under the regulations in effect at the time a complete building permit application is filed, regardless of subsequent changes in zoning or other land use regulations. In other words, "[v]esting `fixes' the rules that will govern the land development regardless of later changes in zoning or other land use regulations." Washington thus recognizes a "date certain" standard. Moreover, under Washington statute (RCW 19.27.095(1)), development rights vest upon the filing of a "valid and fully complete building permit application." The court also analyzed the "invalidity provision" of the GMA — RCA 36.70A.302. Under the invalidity provision, if a local government's comprehensive plan provision or development regulation is deemed in- valid by the Growth Board (because it is noncompliant with the GMA or SEPA and that noncompliance substantially interferes with the fulfill- ment of the GMA goals), the Growth Board can issue a determination of invalidity as to the challenged comprehensive plan provision or develop- ment regulations, but a development permit application filed prior to that determination of invalidity vests to the development regulations under which it was submitted. (RCA 36.70A.302.) Here, Woodway and SRB had argued that under the GMA, "invalid- ity" only related to ordinances found to substantially interfere with the © 2013 Thomson Reuters 7