Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/02/2013

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March 25, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 6 Zoning Bulletin The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that the Sign Code's different restrictions on the different types of noncommercial speech were not based on the content of the speech. Applying the standard of review for restrictions on content -neutral speech, the court also concluded that the Sign Code's Temporary Directional Sign regulations were narrowly tailored to serve governmental interests, and were therefore constitutional. The court explained: "The `government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' In addition to being justified without reference to content, the restric- tions must be `narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the infoi.uation.' " The court rejected Good News' argument that the Sign Code's different restrictions for different types of noncommercial speech were inherently content -based and thus unconstitutional. Instead, the court held that distinc- tions based on the speaker or the event are permissible where there is no discrimination among similar events or speakers. "The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regula- tion of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys," explained the court. Here, the court found that the distinctions in the Sign Code's regulations of Temporary Directional Signs, Ideological Signs, and Political Signs were content neutral: The Sign Code placed no restrictions on the particular viewpoints of any person or entity that sought to erect a Temporary Directional Sign and the exemption applied equally to all. The Town did not adopt its regulation of speech because it disagreed with the message conveyed. Each classification and its restrictions were based on objective factors relevant to the Town's creation of the specific exemption from the permit requirement and did not otherwise consider the substance of the sign. The Political Signs exemption responded to the need for communication about elections. The Ideological Sign exemption recognized that an individual's right to express his or -her opinion is at the core of the First Amendment. The Temporary Directional Sign exemption allowed thesponsor of an event to put up temporary directional signs immediately before the event. Accordingly, the court found that each exemption was based on objective criteria and none drew distinctions based on the particular content of the sign. It made no differ- ence which candidate was supported, who sponsored the event, or what ideo- logical perspective was asserted. In short, the court concluded: "[A]s long as the Temporary Directional Signs exemption which [was] the exemption that was applied to Good News' signs and that Good News challenge[d]—[was] content neutral and reasonable in relationship to its purpose —providing direction to temporary events —its constitutionality would not be affected by the fact that the exemptions for Po- litical Signs or Ideological Signs were different." The court also concluded that the Temporary Directional Signs exemption was narrowly tailored to serve the Town's significant governmental interests 4 © 2013 Thomson Reuters