Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/02/2013

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Zoning Bulletin March 25, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 6 of safety and aesthetics. Good News had contended that the Sign Code was not narrowly tailored because all temporary signs placed within the public right-of-way implicated safety and aesthetic concerns, but Temporary Directional Signs were more severely limited than Political and Ideological Signs. The court explained that, contrary to Good News' argument, to be nar- rowly tailored, restrictions on types of noncommercial speech need not be uniform or vary only to the extent that the type of speech affects a town's interests. For several reasons, the court found it was permissible that Political and Ideological Signs infringed on the Town's interests to a greater extent than Temporary Directional Signs: (1) unlike political, ideological, and religious speech which are clearly entitled to First Amendment protection, there does not appear to be a constitutional right to an exemption for Temporary Directional Signs; (2) each exemption reflected a balance between the Town's interests and the constitutional interests of the type of sign covered; (3) the exemptions were not in competition for limited space; the erection of one type of temporary sign did not preclude the placement of another; (4) there was no showing that the restrictions on Temporary Directional Signs interfered with their purpose: directing interested individuals to temporary events; and (5) courts generally defer to a city's determinations of size and duration. In sum, the court found that: (a) the Town was not required to create an exemption for Temporary Directional Signs; (b) the restrictions on directional signs were rationally related to the purpose of the directional signs; and (c) the restrictions were reasonably designed to promote the Town's interests in aesthetics and safety. Moreover, the Sign Code left open "ample alternate means of communication." See also: Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 587 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2009). See also: G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2006). See also: Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000). Case Note: In its decision, the court acknowledged that it was conceivable that different exemp- tions for noncommercial speech might improperly restrict speech. However, the court found that was not the case here, since the Temporary Directional Sign exemption was: content neutral; and not in competition with other exemptions from the permit requirement (i.e., this was not a.situation where there were a limited number of billboards or maximum number of temporary signs that could be placed in the public right-of-way, nor did the erection of temporary directional signs in any way limit any other person's rights to erect political, ideological, or other signs). Case Note: The court also held that amendments made to the Sign Code during pendency of the appeal (i.e., limiting the temporary directional signs' exemption from the permit ©2013 Thomson Reuters 5