Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/02/2013

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April 10, 2013 I Volume 7 Issue 7 Zoning Bulletin The court explained that whether Moore-King's set of beliefs deserved constitutional protection as a religion, depended on whether they were: (1) sincerely held; and (2) religious in nature under Moore-King's "scheme of things." Because the parties agreed and the record supported the view that Moore -King sincerely held her beliefs, the court focused on the second prong. The court determined that Moore-King's beliefs failed to meet the second prong because they did not amount to "a religious faith as opposed to a way of life." Rather, the court found her beliefs more closely resembled "personal and philosophical choices consistent with a way of life, not deep religious convictions shared by an organized group deserving of constitutional solicitude." Thus, concluded the court, Moore - King could not avail herself of the protections afforded those engaged in religion. Finally, as to Moore-King's Equal Protection argument, the court explained that the County's zoning or licensing ordinance would violate the Equal Protection Clause only if Moore -King could demonstrate "that she ha[d] been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situ- ated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Moore -King had argued that she had been "irrationally treated differently from those engaged in `other office uses'; other fortune tellers, like those at church -sponsored fairs or telling fortunes as stage actors; and other `spiritual readers,' `prophets,' `psychics,' or `advisors.' " The County had contended that Moore -King was not in fact similarly situated to any of those entities, and even if she was, any differential treatment was not without a rational basis. The court agreed with the County. The court said that, assuming without deciding that Moore -King was situated similarly to the entities she identified, she nonetheless failed to carry her burden of negating "every conceivable basis which might sup- port" the County's zoning and licensing ordinances. The court determined that the County could believe it appropriate to impose higher entry costs or more stringent zoning limitations on those seeking to open a business as a fortune teller than on "other office uses" cited by Moore -King in or- der to discourage the —in Moore-King's words —"innumerable scam artists.";Likewise, the County could rationally suppose it proper to place greater regulatory burdens on Moore-King's counseling activities than on the "licensed counselors and advisers to whom she sought to compare herself. Granting the County wide latitude to determine how to regulate those who claim or pretend "to disclose mental faculties of individuals for any form of compensation," the court could not say the County's regula- tory scheme lacked any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. See also: U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 183 L: Ed. 2d 574, 40 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1953 (2012). See also: Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 105 S. Ct. 2557, 86 L. Ed. 2d 130, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 92062 (1985). See also: U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965). 8 © 2013 Thomson Reuters