Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/03/2014

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Zoning Bulletin February 25, 2014 1 Volume 8 1 Issue 4 ripe for adjudication, the court must look at the facts under two prongs of inquiry: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and (2) the hard- ship to the parties of withholding court consideration. The court explained that claims meet the fitness element if the issues: are primarily legal; need no further factual development; and involve a final agency action. The court further explained that claims meet the hardship requirement if a party shows that withholding judicial review would result in direct and immediate hard- ship and would entail more than possible financial loss. Blake had argued that the circuit court's conclusion that "final agency ac- tion" had not occurred was "based on the false premise that 'final agency action' [was] the same thing as 'final project approval from all agencies.' " Blake contended that there was final agency action even when there were pending conditions on a final approval of a permit, and that "[f]inal agency, action refers to the agency's [sic] whose decision is being challenged —not some other agency whose approval for a project may also be necessary." The court agreed with Blake. The court said that " `finality' for purposes of ripeness involves a decision of the agency whose `definitive position' on a matter is being challenged, and a decision of that agency is final for purposes of ripeness even if there are other approvals or conditions that still need to occur." Thus, here, the court found it "clear" that the Planning Commission's final approval of Knudsen's subdivision application was "final agency ac- tion" for purposes of ripeness. The court noted that, here, the Planning Com- mission had granted "final approval" to Knudsen on January 13, 2009, which was months before Blake discovered that Hapa Road was owned by the State. Further, although DLNR would need to grant an easement over Hapa Road, the court noted that the pendency of that approval did not "per se af- fect the finality of the [Planning Commission's] approval of the [subdivi- sion application] for purposes of appeal" because Blake was challenging the Planning Commission's action, and not the action of DLNR. Thus, concluded the court, "in the circumstances of this case, the Planning Com- mission's approval, while given without the [D]LNR's consent to an ease- ment, was nevertheless final agency action for purposes of ripeness.", Based on that conclusion, the couttwent on to hold that Blake's allega- tions were ripe for adjudication. See also: Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and ConzmunityDevelop- ment Corp. of Hawai'i, 121 Haw. 324, 219 P.3d 1111 (2009), as amended, (Nov. 24, 2009). See also: Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 8 Haw. App. 203, 797 P.2d 69 (1990). See also: Leone v. County of Matti, 128 Haw. 183, 284 P.3d 956 (Ct. App. 2012), cert. rejected, 2012 WL 6200401 (Haw. 2012). 2014 Thomson Reuters 11