Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/07/2014

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Zoning Bulletin July 10, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 13 The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the District Council had only the authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the Planning Board's decision. The District Council was therefore limited to determining whether the Planning Board's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, discrimi- natory, or illegal;" it could not consider new issues and reasons for denying Zimmer's application. In so holding, the court pointed to the Maryland Regional District Act (the "RDA") and the Prince George's County Code (the "PGCC"). The RDA was enacted by the state General Assembly to empower the County to create zoning enabling legislation. The court noted that § 20-202(a)(1) of the RDA specifies that the Planning Board is responsible for planning, subdivision, and zoning functions. The court also noted that, pursuant to PGCC § 27-523, the District Council is "only authorized to affiu n, reverse, or modify the decision of the Planning Board, or to return the case to the Planning Board to take further testimony." The court further found that the District Council was, in fact, "expressly limited in its consideration to `the facts and information contained within the record made at the hearing before the Planning Board.' " (PGCC § 27-523(c).) Thus, the court concluded, the District Council was limited to determining whether the Planning Board's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal." See also: County Council of Prince George's County v. Curtis Regency Service Corp., 121 Md. App. 123, 708 A.2611058 (1998). Case Note: In its decision, the court opined that if the District Council were vested with de novo (i.e., original) review, "the Planning Board's legal responsibility to engage in fact finding would be rendered meaningless." Case Note: The District Council had amended the PGCC in an effort to grant itself original jurisdiction. The court held that the District Council could not grant itself original jurisdiction when the General Assembly had expressly entrusted the Planning Board with the authority to decide preliminary zoning issues. The court said that although the District Council had long assumed that it possessed original jurisdiction, a plain reading of the RDA reflected that the Planning Board, not the District Council, was vested with original jurisdiction over zoning matters. The District Council simply could not "insert the magic words `original jurisdiction' and assume that such an amendment authorizes itself with original jurisdiction, especially in light of the provision's conflict with the RDA," said the court. © 2014 Thomson Reuters 11