Agenda - Planning Commission - 03/05/2015

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January 10, 2015 1 Volume 9 1 Issue 1 Zoning Bulletin cupancy of the building, structure or land, (3) to prevent any illegal act, conduct, business, or use in or about the premises, or (4) to re- strain, correct, or abate the violation.( 65 .ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 2012).) The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Talley. It agreed with Talley that § 11-13-15 of the Municipal Code did not allow a plaintiff to challenge the validity of an ordinance. The court found that Nord's "sole avenue of relief was administrative review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law." (735 ILCS 5/3-101 to 3-113.) Because Nord had not sought administrative review of the ordinance, the court found in favor of Talley. Nord appealed. Nord maintained that she could bring a private action against Nord for zoning ordinance violations because his special permit allowed the use of property in a manner that would otherwise violate the zoning ordinance. Nord argued that the valid- ity of the special use permit had a direct bearing on whether Talley was violating the zoning ordinance. DECISION: Judgment of circuit court affirmed. The Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District concluded that § 11-13-15 of the Municipal Code did not permit Nord to challenge the validity of the special use permit through an action against a Talley, "a private violator of the Village's zoning ordinance." Rather, the court held, a person challenging the validity of a special use permit must do so through an action against the municipality seeking to invalidate the grant of the permit. The court explained that a legislative decision such as the enact- ment of an ordinance granting a variance application is reviewable through a declaratory judgment proceeding challenging the validity of the ordinance. To have an ordinance declared invalid, the com- plaint "must allege that it is `arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable' and bears `no substantial relation to the public health, safety or gen- eral welfare' [citation], or in some other way violates the plaintiffs' constitutional rights." Here, Nord had filed an action against the Village seeking to invalidate Talley's special use permit but she had based that chal- lenge on alleged Open Meetings Act violations. Nord failed to al- lege that the Village, in granting the special use permit, acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or that the special use permit bore no rational relationship to the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the public. She had only brought those allegations against Talley. The court concluded that because Nord failed to "appropriately 4 2015 Thomson Reuters