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Agenda - Planning Commission - 03/05/2015
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Agenda - Planning Commission - 03/05/2015
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Meetings
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Planning Commission
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03/05/2015
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February 10, 2015 1 Volume 9 1 Issue 3 Zoning Bulletin <br />The Town maintained that the statute as a whole compelled the conclu- <br />sion that legislature chose not to limit payment of refunds to the original <br />payor. To emphasize its argument and by way of comparison, the Town <br />pointed to mandatory refund language in the state's exaction fee statute, <br />which directed that a "refund shall be made to the payor or payor's succes- <br />sor in interest." <br />The court found the Town's argument compelling. The court found the <br />fact that the legislature used different language when addressing impact <br />fees and exaction fees supported a conclusion that the legislature intended <br />different meanings. The court concluded that, under statute, the impact fee <br />refund was not limited only to the "payor or payor's successor in interest," <br />as was the exaction fee refund. <br />See also: State Employees Ass 'n of New Hampshire, SEIU, Local <br />1984(SEA) v. New Hampshire Div. of Personnel, 158 N.H. 338, 345, 965 <br />A.2d 1116 (2009). <br />Case Note: <br />Gerald Gagnon, Sr. had also intervened in the matter. He argued that, as a <br />successor -in -interest to Woodview Development Corporation, he was entitled to a <br />refund of impact fees that the corporation had paid prior to selling its properties. <br />Case Note: <br />The Developers had also argued that the legislative history supported their inter- <br />pretation of impact fee "refund." However, because the appellate court did not <br />find the term "refund" ambiguous, it declined to consider the legislative history. <br />Case Note: <br />In its decision, the court noted that courts in other jurisdictions have held that a <br />"refunded" fee can be paid to an entity other than the original payor. See, e.g., <br />Washington Urban League v. F.E.R. C., 886F.2d 1381, 1386 (3d Cir. 1989); Texas <br />Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 414 F.2d 344, 348- <br />49, 80 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 342 (5th Cir. 1969); Southern County Mut. Ins. v. <br />Surety Bank, N.A., 270 S.W.3d 684, 688-89 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2008); Lake <br />County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd. of State of Ill., 119 Ill. 2d 419, <br />116111. Dec. 567, 519 N.E.2d 459, 461-62 (1988). <br />4 © 2015 Thomson Reuters <br />
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