Agenda - Planning Commission - 03/05/2015

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Zoning Bulletin February 10, 2015 1 Volume 9 1 Issue 3 Inverse Condemnation --Under ordinance, when adjacent Tots came under common ownership, they merged Lot owners alleged merger of Tots deprived use of one lot, amounting to a compensable taking Citation: Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014) WISCONSIN (12/23/14)—This case addressed the issue of whether an ordinance that merged two adjacent lots under common ownership deprived the owners of all or substantially all practical use of their prop- erty such as to amount to a compensatory taking. The Background/Facts: Joseph MU1T, Michael Murr, Donna Murr, and Peggy Heaver (collectively, the "Muffs") owned adjacent lots—Lot E and Lot F—near a river in St. Croix County (the "County"), Wisconsin. The Murrs' parents had purchased the lots separately in the 1960s. On Lot F, the MUTTS' parents built a cabin. Lot E was allegedly purchased as an investment property, with the intention of developing it separate from Lot F or selling it to a third party. Together the lots contained approximately 0.98 acres. The Murrs' parents transferred Lot F to the Murrs in 1994. They transferred Lot E to the Murrs in 1995. Under a County ordinance, § 17.36I.4.a (the "Ordinance"), the 1995 transfer of Lot E brought the lots under common ownership and resulted in a merger of the two lots. The Ordinance prohibited the individual development or sale of adjacent, substandard lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot had at least one acre of net project area. However, if abutting, commonly owned lots did not each contain the minimum net project area, they together suf- ficed as a single, buildable lot. Years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E as a buildable lot. They sought a variance to separately use or sell their two contiguous lots. That variance was denied, and the denial was upheld in court. The MUM then filed a complaint against the State of Wisconsin (the "State") and the County. The MulTs alleged that the Ordinance resulted in an uncompen- sated taking of their property. They maintained that the merger of their lots under the Ordinance deprived them of "all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot [could] not be sold or developed as a separate lot." They alleged that the lot was usable only for a single-family resi- dence, and that without the ability to sell or develop it, the lot was rendered useless. Finding no material issues of fact, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the County and State. © 2015 Thomson Reuters 5