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Agenda - Council - 12/20/1983
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Agenda - Council - 12/20/1983
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Meetings
Meeting Document Type
Agenda
Meeting Type
Council
Document Date
12/20/1983
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I <br /> I <br /> I <br /> I <br /> I <br /> I <br /> <br />Page -6- <br /> <br />"Significantly, the supreme court, while testing the constitu- <br />tionality of a "grandfather" provision, has emphasized the <br />importance of articulating the legislative purpose. <br /> <br />The opinion in United States v. Maryland Savings-share <br />Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 91 S.Ct. 16, 27L.Ed2d 4 (1970), <br />then, appears to suggest the possibility that a "grandfather" <br />provision will not survive equal protection scrutiny unless <br />the legislative history reveals some specified purpose for its <br />inclusion in the statute. Such a rule might be rationalized <br />on the ground that "grandfather" clauses possess especially <br />strong potential for abuse of the political process." <br /> <br />Id. at 1095. However, the court reluctantly agreed to consider alternative <br /> <br />explanations for the legislatures' behavior since the record was completely void of <br /> <br />any indication of legislative intent or purpose. <br /> <br />Similarly, in Murillo v. Bambrick, 508 F.Supp. 830, 833 (D.N.J. 1981) the court <br /> <br />considered the state's arguments of legislative purpose as follows: <br /> <br />"The defendant contends that the state has had a long <br />standing policy of 'not encouraging' divorces, and that this <br />policy continued at least through September, 1980. Solely <br />because the defendant in this case is an officer of the State <br />of New Jersey, represented by the attorney general of New <br />3ersey~ does not mean that the court is bound to accept his <br />contention as to the articulated purposes of the state. <br />Although defendant may be cloaked in the mantel of the <br />State of New Jersey when he appears before this court, he <br />does so with the same burdens and responsibilities as any <br />other litigant. Defendant's assertions of New 3ersey state <br />policy are not sacrosanct. This court is empowered N <br />indeed it is required -- to pierce the surface of defendant's <br />assertions and to examine the actual purposes underlying the <br />statute in question." <br /> <br />Id. at 838. The court then went on to review a statement by the committee of the <br /> <br />state legislature, and the testimony at trial in its entirety to determine the <br /> <br />"purpose" of the statute involved. Id. at 838. See also Grove v. Ohio State <br /> <br />University~ College of Veterinary Medicine, 424 F.S{~pp. 377, 387-388 (S.D. Ohio <br /> <br />1976) ("articulated state purpose" must be found by looking a~t "direct statutory <br /> <br />indication" of such a purpose and the non-adversial statement of University's Board <br /> <br />of Trustees). <br /> <br />I <br /> <br /> <br />
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