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irs alone as a legitimate object of police power
<br />regulation, and most states today interpret their
<br />state constitutions as equally permitting attain-
<br />ment of this goal. The more interesting question
<br />is whether design review and guidelines truly
<br />achieve a more pleasing or stimulating' pflysica(
<br />environment, or whether, in theory and prao
<br />tice, planning efforts to secure better aesthetic
<br />outcomes are misguided. Me answer is as
<br />much philosophical as empirical, Some private
<br />designers believe that public control over
<br />design is antithetical to the creative process, an
<br />interference with design as artistic venture.
<br />Many describe the results of design review as a
<br />monotonous, [owest.common-denominator
<br />built environment that, in service of conformity
<br />with context, is bereft of adventure, challenge,
<br />or whimsy. Public planners would claim that
<br />design review equai(y often rescues cities from
<br />mediocrity, forcing developers to meet higher
<br />artistic standards than they otherwise would.
<br />Context may not be ail, the,/say, but if aesthet-
<br />ics-based zoning can hetp secure a sense of
<br />place in new architecture, even at the cost of
<br />occasionally reining in the promise of wild
<br />adventure, then it is worthwhile.
<br />
<br />LESS I$ MORE
<br />The mandatory prescriptive approach enjoys
<br />its antipode in what some call flexible zoning,
<br />but what might be more accurately coiled no
<br />zoning. Here, government exercises no poiice
<br />power land-use reguia£ory oversight over the
<br />use and development of tend, within 'parts or
<br />alt ora cib/. ]'his is not the same as saying
<br />there are no legat restrictions whatsoever.
<br />Land in Houston, that notorious poster child
<br />for no zoning, is actuatly riddled with private
<br />legal restrictions and subject to public re§ute-
<br />lions of various kinds that effectively control
<br />much of what is developable on land. Still,
<br />Houston properties are net encumbered by
<br />conventional zoning, and the results are
<br />there for afl to see. Some see great differ-
<br />ence, especially fn the iumbie of uses iocat-
<br />ed cheek-by-jowl at the neighborhood level
<br />and the observable absence of a pedestri-
<br />an-friendly public realm. Others are sur-
<br />prised at the degree to which the city's
<br />downtown resembles zoned downtowns in
<br />other parts of the Southwest and South.
<br />
<br />Whatever the empirical judgment in
<br />Houston, the "no zonin§" approach has never
<br />
<br />gained traction in other American cities. It is
<br />one thing for Houston, with legacy as destiny,
<br />to continue in that tradition, atthou§h it is worth
<br />observing that Houston i/self consistently steps
<br />to the zoning brink, most recently with consid-
<br />eration of neighborhood-based restrictions on
<br />building form. Understandably, it declines to
<br />call such potential restrictions zoning for fear of
<br />committing singular identib/suicide. Elsewhere,
<br />however, too many people have too much ora
<br />stake in the existing zoning system to beiieve
<br />that their rib/could throw out the baby with the
<br />bath water. No one truly trusts a private deveb
<br />
<br />Land in Houston, that
<br />notorious poster child for
<br />no zoning, is actually
<br />riddled with private legal
<br />restrictions and subject to
<br />public re§ulations of
<br />various kinds that effec-
<br />tively control much of what
<br />is developable on land.
<br />
<br />oper or neighborhood to plan for itse(f, for fear
<br />that such self-interest would contradict other
<br />stakeholder interests. In short, the "no zoning"
<br />experience in Houston stands foremost as an
<br />ideological beacon for private properb/advo-
<br />cates rather than a practical alternative for
<br />urban land-use re§ulation.
<br /> The "no zoning" approach has wider
<br />appeal, however, when it comes to consider-
<br />lng areas where economic development is the
<br />overriding goal. Taking a cue from the British
<br />experience with enterprise zones and
<br />America's copycat empowerment zones, cities
<br />couid waive zoning, other re§uiations, and
<br />local taxes within a defined geographic zone,
<br />to encourage development, especially job-
<br />producing development. Empirical evidence
<br />from British and American zones suggests a
<br />!ess-than.robust outcome, however, with
<br />development activities often shifted from a
<br />non-qualifying location to a qualifying one
<br />without an increase in net jobs within the city.
<br />
<br /> THE HAL?'NAY HOUSE OF
<br /> MARl(ET-BASED ZONING
<br />
<br />Lurkin§ between mandated prescriptive zon-
<br />ing and no zoning are efforts where cities use
<br />zoning as carrot rather than stick to encour-
<br />age the private real· estate market to act in
<br />desired ways. Although conceptually revolu-
<br />tionary when first introduced in the late
<br />~95os, the market-based technique of incen-
<br />tive zoning has subsequently experienced
<br />counter, revolutions and revisionist thinking
<br />as some of its flaws have become apparent.
<br />Under incentive zoning, cities dan§to finan-
<br />cially valuable zoning concessions to encour-
<br />age developers to provide 'desired public
<br />amenities. Typical incentives include density
<br />bonuses; height, setback, yard, and coverage
<br />waivers; and parking ratio reductions, a~l
<br />d. esigned either to increase revenue (more
<br />rentable or sellable space) or reduce costs
<br />(more cost-efficient floor layouts, for exam-
<br />pre). Typical amenities may be divided into
<br />urban design (plazas, arcades, parks,
<br />streetscape improvements, better design),
<br />cultural (arts, museums, libraries), and social
<br />(affordable housing, day care centers) cate-
<br />gories, although even market-provided uses
<br />such as retail facilities and restaurants are
<br />sometimes encouraged.
<br />
<br /> incentive zoning may be administered
<br />by rule or discretion. In a rule-based system,
<br />the incentives and amenities are expressly
<br />and precisely delineated in the zoning text,
<br />and the developer receives the zoning con-
<br />cession as a matter of right if she provides
<br />the amen/b/as described. In a discretionary
<br />system, the incentives and amenities are only
<br />broadly described in the zoning text, while
<br />the specific details are hammered out in proj-
<br />ect-by-project negotiations between the city
<br />and the developer. In either case, to make the
<br />bargain economically viable, the real estate
<br />financial value of the zoning' incentive must
<br />equal or exceed the real estate financial cos[
<br />(capital and operatfn.¢ of providing the
<br />amenity,
<br />
<br /> In theory, incentive zoning should be
<br />limited to circumstances where the incentive
<br />is ne~essap/, sufficient, but not excessive, to
<br />secure the private sector's cooperation, The
<br />incentive should be necessary because, if the
<br />city could obtain the amenity without it, it
<br />would be better off. It is all too easy to forget
<br />
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<br />ZONING PRACTICE ol.04
<br />AMERICAN PLAtlNIN6 ASSOCIATION
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