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standing shapes planning approaches in many <br />European and South American countries, as well <br />as in a few American and Canadian cities. <br />Who pays and who benefits from value <br />capture? In order to determine the effect of <br />value capture on land values, we need to con- <br />sider two scenarios: "base density plus" and <br />"rezonings." <br />Base Density Plus <br />Under this scenario developers have the choice <br />of building at an established base density for <br />which they pay prescribed exactions (or not, <br />depending on the locality), or of trading ad- <br />ditional densities (or other incentives such <br />as greater height or reduced parking require- <br />ments) for amenities. Under the scenario ofa <br />fair economic trade-off between incentives and <br />amenities, land prices should be unaffected. <br />If—as was the case in New York in the 19805— <br />the value of the incentives is much higher <br />than the cost of the amenities, the value of the <br />land is likely to rise. In the opposite case, the <br />developer will not choose to use the incentive <br />KEY QUESTIONS <br />1. 1s the additional density based on good <br />planning principles? <br />2. In the trade-off between the public <br />costs of additional density and the ben- <br />efits of public amenities, is the public <br />interest clearly the winner? <br />3. Was the trade-off system openly based <br />on economic analysis and extensive <br />public participation? <br />4. Were accountability and transparency <br />an integral part of the process? <br />under appropriate market conditions, will <br />lead to higher land prices. Under the "rezon- <br />ing" scenario, for example, developers might <br />acquire land zoned industrial—a use for which <br />there is no demand—and initiate the process <br />of rezoning the land to medium -density resi- <br />dential. Presumably developers will pay less <br />for industrially zoned land than residentially <br />market, the levy should not cause land prices <br />to rise significantly. <br />In conclusion, both developers (who get <br />the rezoning) and the community win. Land- <br />owners will win because they will be able to <br />sell their land, but not at a price that reflects <br />the higher-level use. <br />Could "density plus" and "rezonings" <br />be likened to selling zoning? That depends on <br />whether the value capture scheme is based on a <br />plan and how good the plan is. Key questions: Is <br />the additional density based on good planning <br />principles? In the trade-off between the public <br />costs of additional density and the benefits of <br />public amenities, is the public interest clearly <br />the winner? Was the trade-off system openly <br />based on economic analysis and extensive pub- <br />lic participation? Were accountability and trans- <br />parency an integral part of the process? <br />PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY <br />BENEFITS <br />In changing from a top-down, command -and - <br />control approach to a market-based approach, <br />�. _,� <br />An April 1.5, 2015, public meeting on community benefits to <br />California's Downtown Area Plan. <br />zoning option, and the city will have to reduce <br />the level of amenities. <br />To summarize, the consumer benefits <br />because of the increase in market choices and <br />the amenities provided, while the developer <br />also benefits from the amenities as well as <br />from higher profits. The landowner still profits <br />from selling the land, but at a price that reflects <br />the base density only or slightly more. <br />Rezonings <br />Localities have the discretionary power to <br />rezone properties to allow higher densities or <br />change land -use designations. These changes, <br />be generated from five skyscrapers proposed by Berkeley, <br />zoned property, allowing them to provide com- <br />munity benefits, cover the cost of the rezoning, <br />and gain a portion of the "enhanced value" <br />resulting from the rezoning as additional profit. <br />How this scenario plays in real life will <br />depend on the market and circumstances in a <br />given locale. It could be argued, for example, <br />that landowners, anticipating the likelihood <br />ofa rezoning to a more valuable use, will seek <br />a higher return over industrial land value, in <br />effect withdrawing their property from the mar- <br />ket. But if the rezoning is part of an overall plan <br />to change land uses or increase densities, thus <br />increasing the supply of land available on the <br />planning has also embraced a more participa- <br />tory, community -empowering planning pro- <br />cess. The fact that value capture is wedded <br />to an engaged citizenry is in large part due <br />to this shift. However, when public benefits <br />that are part of the status quo are exchanged <br />for other public benefits in a value capture <br />context that enhances developers' profits, it <br />behooves planners to provide ample opportu- <br />nities for -transparency and accountability and <br />for citizens to demand the same. As we shall <br />see from the Santa Monica and San Francisco, <br />California, case studies, value capture origi- <br />nated from citizen demands and was enacted <br />ZONINGPRACTICE 6.15 <br />AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION Ipage 4 <br />