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-6- that Erickson would not be able to obtain a reasonable return on its investment through future rentals. The concept of reasonable return on investment is a new development. In another case, McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (1980), the Minnesota Supreme C~u~ti-h-~3i-~ated a zoning ordinance which regulated the use of land adjacent to an airport on the runway approach zone to agricultural uses and in a different zone to popul, ation density not to exceed 15 persons per acre, because it constituted a taking of the property without.just compensation. The city of Faribault argued that the proper test was whether there was no reasonable use of the property left to the landowners. If this was the case, the City argued compensation should be paid, but if any reasonable use remained, the City argued no compensation should be paid to the landowner. While reciting that no taking occurs unless all reasonable uses of the property'have been proscribed, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that this ordinance was a regulation for the sole benefit of a governmental enterprise, namely Faribault Municipal Airport, and thus, even though the property retains some reasonable usefulness, the public should pay for decrease in value. In August, 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in Pratt v. State of Minnesota, 309 N.W.2d 767 (1981). Although this case involved a challenge to the Department of Natural Resources, public waters regulations, the Supreme Court indicated that its reasoning in McShane (above) is likely to be applied in future takings cases. Equal Protection. Another specific constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance is to argue that the law is not being equally applied to all landowners. The equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that laws be applied equally to all who are subject to them. If it can be established that the zoning ordinance is being applied differently to people similarly situated, the ordinance will be invalidated as applied to that person. For example, in the Minnesota case of Hay v. Township of Grow, 206 N.W.2d 19 (1973), the Supreme Court require-~-~ne issuance~f a permit for the construction of a mobile home court. Mr. Hay had applied for a permit to construct a mobile home court. At approximately the same time, another individual, Carlyle, also applied for a permit to construct a mobile home court. Hay's permit was denied, and Carlyle's permit was granted. The Supreme Court held that since both applications for permits were filed almost simultaneously, both applicants had to be afforded equal treatment, and one application could not be preferred over another for reasons whi-ch were not expressed and not related to the health, welfare, or safety of the community or to any particular and permissible standards and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance. The lesson is that no legitimate interest of a municipality is furthered by treating individuals differentially.