Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/02/2016

Home

Zoning Bulletin May 10, 2016 I Volume 10 I Issue 9 court had concluded that the Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact, finding that the Village's rejection of R-M zoning in favor of R-T zoning had a significant disparate impact on minorities because it "largely eliminated the potential for the type of housing that minorities were disproportionately likely to need namely, affordable rental units." The Second Circuit agreed with this assessment. The district court had also found that R-T zoning advanced certain legitimate, bona fide governmental interests: reduced traffic; and the construction of townhouses. The Second Circuit agreed that the Village identified such legitimate, bona fide governmental interests. The district court had held that the Village "did not establish the absence of a less discriminatory alternative." The Second Circuit found it clear that the district court shifted the burden to the Village to prove both a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and "that no alternative would serve. . .with less discriminatory effect." Under the HUD regulation, the burden should have shifted back to the Plaintiffs to prove an available alternative practice that had less disparate impact and served the Village's legitimate nondiscriminatory intent. Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the disparate -impact claim to the district court for consideration of whether the Plaintiffs met that burden. See also: Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop- ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977). Case Note: The Plaintiffs had also sued the County, arguing that it failed to prevent the rezon- ing discrimination. The Plaintiffs had also argued that the County's actions and policies in steering affordable housing to. certain communities violated its obliga- tions under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not to discriminate in the administration of federal famding, and under § 808 of the FHA to affirmatively fur- ther fair housing. The district court dismissed all claims against the county. It concluded that the County was not causally responsible for the alleged discrimina- tory conduct of the Village. The district court also rejected the Plaintiffs' challenge to the County's policies regarding the siting of affordable housing under § 808 of the Fair Housing Act, concluding that the Plaintiffs lacked a private cause of action to enforce this provision. The Plaintiffs cross -appealed the district court's grant of srunmmy judgment to the County. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the Plaintiffs' claim against the County, which alleged that the County approved of the Village's discrimination, was premised on speculation. As to the Plaintiffs' claim that the County was steering affordable housing to its low-income, majority -minority com- munities, the court found those were `factually -intensive" claims that needed to be remanded to the district court to address. Case Note: In its decision, the court also addressed the issue of whether it was required to fol- low the HUD regulation on disparate -impact liability standards. Since the court had never held the FHA to be unambiguous, it found it was obliged to defer to the HUD regulations. ©2016 Thomson Reuters 11