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Country Joe, Inc., et al., Respondents, vs. City of Eagan, petitioner, Appellant. C8-95-228... Page 5 of 7
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<br />impact fee in a recent session as evidence that the Minnesota legislature has not endorsed the concept of
<br />impact fees. See H.F. 988, 79th Leg. (Minn. 1995) (a bill to amend §. 462.358 of the Municipal Planning
<br />Act to authorize school impact fees).
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<br />The city responds by citing a number of decisions from other states that allegedly uphold the imposition
<br />of impact fees without express statutory enabling legislation.
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<br />We conclude, however, that we need not reach the issue of whether impact fees are attthorized in
<br />Minnesota in order to pass on the validity of the road unit connection charge imposed by the city. By
<br />definition, an impact fee must be "in an amount wh/ch is proportionate to the need for the public
<br />facilities generated, by new development." B laesser & Kentopp at 264. In this case, however, the city.
<br />essentially ignored its own consulting engineers' recommendation that the road unit connection charge
<br />be periodically updated to account for changes in' costs, revenue projections, or patterns of development.
<br />Thus, for the period in question, there is insufficient evidence that the charge was proportionate to the
<br />need created by the development upon which the burden of payment fell. Accordingly, we reserve the
<br />issue of whether impact fees are authorized under Minnesota law, but reject the city's contention that the
<br />road unit connection charge draws its authorization as such a fee:
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<br />III.
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<br />The city's final argument is that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the road unit connection
<br />charge is an unlawful tax. [~] The city argues that the charge is not a tax and suggests that the charge is
<br />authorized as a regulatory or license fee under its general welfare powers. See Minn. Stat. § 412.221,
<br />subd. 32.
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<br />We have consistently rejected the argument that the general police power extends to permit revenue
<br />raising measures by municipalities. When it has been apparent that a city's true motivation was to raise
<br />revenue--and not merely to recover the costs of regulation--we have disregarded the fee label attached
<br />by a municipality and held that the charge in question was in fact a tax. See State v. Labo's Direct Serv.,
<br />232 Minn. 175, 182, 44 N.W.2d 823,827 (1950) (striking down a fee on gasoline pumps as "a tax for
<br />the purpose of producing more revenue for the municipality"); Barton v. Ci~, of Minneapolis, 212 Minn.
<br />566, 570, 4 N.W.2d 622, 624 (1942) (invalidating a license fee after concluding that "[w]hat the city
<br />council sought to accomplish, and did accomplish, was the enactment of a revenue measure").
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<br />The contractors assert that the road unit connection charge cannot find validity "under the cloak of' the
<br />city's police power" ~br two reasons: first, there is already a separate building permit fee which covers
<br />the purely regulatory costs of building permit issuance and enforcement; and second, the plain language
<br />of the resolution enacting the charge indicates that it was enacted "for the purpose Of funding oversizing
<br />of mai or streets" as well as to provide "an equitable source of funding" for such development and was,
<br />thus, expressly intended to raise revenue. We agree.
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<br />We conclude that the charge is a revenue measure, benefiting the public in general, and is not an
<br />authorized exercise of the city's police powers, rn reaching this conclusion, we find it significant that
<br />revenues collected from the road unit connection charge are not earmarked in any way to fund projects
<br />necessitated by new development, but instead fund all major street construction, as well as repairs of
<br />existing streets. Because it is not a purely regulatory or license fee but instead a revenue measure, the
<br />road unit connection charge is a tax which must draw its authorization, if at all, fi'om the city's powers of
<br />taxation. Accord Eastern Diversified, 319 Md. at 54-55,570 A.2d at 854-55 (determining that a road
<br />improvement impact fee was a tax because "[n]othing * * * suggests that- * ~ * [the] fees are charged
<br />solely on the basis of service provided to the property owner, or to defray expenses of the development
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