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Country Joe, Inc., et al., Respondents, vs. City of Eagan, petitioner, Appellant. C8-95-228... Page 5 of 7 <br /> <br />impact fee in a recent session as evidence that the Minnesota legislature has not endorsed the concept of <br />impact fees. See H.F. 988, 79th Leg. (Minn. 1995) (a bill to amend §. 462.358 of the Municipal Planning <br />Act to authorize school impact fees). <br /> <br />The city responds by citing a number of decisions from other states that allegedly uphold the imposition <br />of impact fees without express statutory enabling legislation. <br /> <br />We conclude, however, that we need not reach the issue of whether impact fees are attthorized in <br />Minnesota in order to pass on the validity of the road unit connection charge imposed by the city. By <br />definition, an impact fee must be "in an amount wh/ch is proportionate to the need for the public <br />facilities generated, by new development." B laesser & Kentopp at 264. In this case, however, the city. <br />essentially ignored its own consulting engineers' recommendation that the road unit connection charge <br />be periodically updated to account for changes in' costs, revenue projections, or patterns of development. <br />Thus, for the period in question, there is insufficient evidence that the charge was proportionate to the <br />need created by the development upon which the burden of payment fell. Accordingly, we reserve the <br />issue of whether impact fees are authorized under Minnesota law, but reject the city's contention that the <br />road unit connection charge draws its authorization as such a fee: <br /> <br />III. <br /> <br />The city's final argument is that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the road unit connection <br />charge is an unlawful tax. [~] The city argues that the charge is not a tax and suggests that the charge is <br />authorized as a regulatory or license fee under its general welfare powers. See Minn. Stat. § 412.221, <br />subd. 32. <br /> <br />We have consistently rejected the argument that the general police power extends to permit revenue <br />raising measures by municipalities. When it has been apparent that a city's true motivation was to raise <br />revenue--and not merely to recover the costs of regulation--we have disregarded the fee label attached <br />by a municipality and held that the charge in question was in fact a tax. See State v. Labo's Direct Serv., <br />232 Minn. 175, 182, 44 N.W.2d 823,827 (1950) (striking down a fee on gasoline pumps as "a tax for <br />the purpose of producing more revenue for the municipality"); Barton v. Ci~, of Minneapolis, 212 Minn. <br />566, 570, 4 N.W.2d 622, 624 (1942) (invalidating a license fee after concluding that "[w]hat the city <br />council sought to accomplish, and did accomplish, was the enactment of a revenue measure"). <br /> <br />The contractors assert that the road unit connection charge cannot find validity "under the cloak of' the <br />city's police power" ~br two reasons: first, there is already a separate building permit fee which covers <br />the purely regulatory costs of building permit issuance and enforcement; and second, the plain language <br />of the resolution enacting the charge indicates that it was enacted "for the purpose Of funding oversizing <br />of mai or streets" as well as to provide "an equitable source of funding" for such development and was, <br />thus, expressly intended to raise revenue. We agree. <br /> <br />We conclude that the charge is a revenue measure, benefiting the public in general, and is not an <br />authorized exercise of the city's police powers, rn reaching this conclusion, we find it significant that <br />revenues collected from the road unit connection charge are not earmarked in any way to fund projects <br />necessitated by new development, but instead fund all major street construction, as well as repairs of <br />existing streets. Because it is not a purely regulatory or license fee but instead a revenue measure, the <br />road unit connection charge is a tax which must draw its authorization, if at all, fi'om the city's powers of <br />taxation. Accord Eastern Diversified, 319 Md. at 54-55,570 A.2d at 854-55 (determining that a road <br />improvement impact fee was a tax because "[n]othing * * * suggests that- * ~ * [the] fees are charged <br />solely on the basis of service provided to the property owner, or to defray expenses of the development <br /> <br />70 <br /> <br /> <br />