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county ditch which by-passed the property of the <br />county board member although the existin§ ditch <br />cut through a substantial area of his property. <br />Nevertheless, he participated in preliminary pro- <br />ceedings before the board regarding the feasibility <br />of the improvement and the need for a preliminary <br />survey though he absented himself from the final <br />hearing. In using these facts as additional support <br />for sustaining the order of the trial court vacating <br />~he county board's order, the Court said that <br />since the preliminary proceedings may have a sub- <br />stantial effect, on later actions taken at the final <br />hearing, "it would seem clear that under well- <br />established principles, he should not have patti- <br />cipated in any of the proceedings regarding this <br />'project." <br /> <br />The £enz case, decided 16 years later, speci- <br />fically held that there is no disqualifying conflict <br />of interest where four of the five managers of a <br />watershed district own land which ~ill be benefited <br />by the proposed district. The Court drew a parallel <br />between the facts in the Lenz case and the situa- <br />tion where members of a municipal council assess <br />lauds owned by them for municipal improvements. <br />This potential conflict of interest, the Court-said, <br />does not itself disqualify them from participating <br />ia the improvement proceedings. This view is in <br />~ccord with most of the cases elsewhere in the <br />country, though there are some decisions to the <br />contrary. Lewis v. Forest City Special Improvement <br />~isrrict, 156 Ark. 356,246 S.W. 867,870 (1923} - <br />council member not disqualified because as owner <br />he signed, petition for improvement; Jeffrey v. <br />~?a!h~as, 232 Cal. App. 2d 29, 42 Cal. Reptr. 486 <br /> (~965) formation of improvement district; <br />Corliss v. Highland Park, 132 tVlich. 152, 93 N.W. <br />254, 95 N.W. 416 (1903) -formation of improve- <br />ment district; City of Topeka v. Huntoon, 46 Kan. <br />634, 26 Pac. 488 {1891)- establishment of sewer <br />district; Pursiful v. Harlan, 222 Ky. 658, 1 S.W. <br />2d 'i043 (1928} - change in street grade;Hamrick <br />~;. ']'owtt of AIbertville, 21 Ala. 465, 122 So. 488, <br />456 (1929) - street improvement; Goff v. Nolan, <br />62 How. Pr, N.Y. 323 {1881}- street widening. <br /> <br /> it is .conceivable that property ownership <br />by a council member might result in more favor- <br />able treatment of that property in the assessment. <br />If that were to result, the assessment might be <br />challenged for arbitrariness and set aside, whether <br />or not the council member participated in the <br />assessment proceedings. <br /> <br /> 6. Condemnation of land. There should be <br />little doubt that a council member's ownership <br />of land or a substantial interest, in land is sb direct <br />and significant as to preclude participation by the <br />council member in a resolution for condemnation <br />of the land. (Eways v. Reading Parking Authoriry, <br />385 Pa 592,124 Atl. 2d 92, 1956.} The Minnesota <br />court has not ruled directly on this question <br />though, in holding that ownership of land ad- <br />joining a proposed highway did not disqualify a <br /> <br /> board member from participating in proceedings <br /> to establish the highway, it hinted that its answer <br /> might have been different if the owner had been <br /> entitled to damages because the highway went. <br /> through his property. (Webster v. Board of Count), <br /> Commissioners of County of Washington, 26 Minn. <br /> 220, 2 N.W. 697, 1897.} .. <br /> <br /> 7. Street vacation. The Minnesota court has <br />not passed on this question, but the Attorney <br />General has ruled that under the reasoning of the <br />case of Petition of Jacobsen, 234 Minn. 296, 48 <br />N.W. 2d 441 (1951), a-council member who has <br />an interest in property abutting a street proposed <br />'to be vacated may not participate in the street <br />vacation proceedings. (A.G. Op. 396g-16, LMC <br />'130d.) He relied also on Pyatt v. Mayor and <br />Council of Borough of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, <br />89 Ail. 2d 1 (1952}. That case held that two. <br />'council members who were employees of 'the <br />company whose plant abutted the street to be <br />vacated were "infected with the taint of self- <br />interest, that a street vacation proceeding before <br />the council was judicial in character, and the or- <br />dinance vacating the street.was therefore voidabib <br />because of the ancient principle that "no man <br />shall be a judge in his own cause." To the same <br />effect is Smith v. City of Centralia, 55 Wash. <br />573, 104 Pac. 797 0909}'.. ' <br /> it is argUable that a street, vacation is not <br />essentially different from the establishment of <br />the street in the first instance as to which abuttifig <br />owners have been held not to have a disqualifying <br />interest. See 4 above. However, in view of cases <br />like those cited above as welt as the Attorney <br />General's ruling based on the Jacobsen case, it <br />would be wise for a council member owning pro- <br />perry abutting a street proposed to be vacated <br />to refrain from participating in vacation proceeding. <br />before the council -'~' .. <br /> <br /> 8. Zoning decisions. No Minnesota case 'has <br />dealt with the conflict of interest principle as <br />applied to council decisions in zoning matters. <br />Probably whether or not the member's property <br />ownership disqualifies him from participating in <br />the council action will depend, to some extent at <br />least, on the amount of that interest as compared <br />to all land affected by the decision. At one extreme <br />is adoption of a new zoning ordinance or a compre- <br />hensive revision of an existing ordinance which <br />may have an impact on all property in the city· <br />Here the council member's interest is not personal <br />and he should be able to participate. Otherwise, <br />since almost all council members may be property- <br />owners, no such ordinance could ever be adopted. <br /> <br /> At the other extreme is the application for a <br />zoning variance or special use permit applying only <br />to property owned by the council member. Clearly <br />he has such a special interest here to disqualify him <br />from participating in the proceedings except to <br />submit the requisite application to the city. Between <br /> <br /> <br />