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county ditch which by-passed the property of the
<br />county board member although the existin§ ditch
<br />cut through a substantial area of his property.
<br />Nevertheless, he participated in preliminary pro-
<br />ceedings before the board regarding the feasibility
<br />of the improvement and the need for a preliminary
<br />survey though he absented himself from the final
<br />hearing. In using these facts as additional support
<br />for sustaining the order of the trial court vacating
<br />~he county board's order, the Court said that
<br />since the preliminary proceedings may have a sub-
<br />stantial effect, on later actions taken at the final
<br />hearing, "it would seem clear that under well-
<br />established principles, he should not have patti-
<br />cipated in any of the proceedings regarding this
<br />'project."
<br />
<br />The £enz case, decided 16 years later, speci-
<br />fically held that there is no disqualifying conflict
<br />of interest where four of the five managers of a
<br />watershed district own land which ~ill be benefited
<br />by the proposed district. The Court drew a parallel
<br />between the facts in the Lenz case and the situa-
<br />tion where members of a municipal council assess
<br />lauds owned by them for municipal improvements.
<br />This potential conflict of interest, the Court-said,
<br />does not itself disqualify them from participating
<br />ia the improvement proceedings. This view is in
<br />~ccord with most of the cases elsewhere in the
<br />country, though there are some decisions to the
<br />contrary. Lewis v. Forest City Special Improvement
<br />~isrrict, 156 Ark. 356,246 S.W. 867,870 (1923} -
<br />council member not disqualified because as owner
<br />he signed, petition for improvement; Jeffrey v.
<br />~?a!h~as, 232 Cal. App. 2d 29, 42 Cal. Reptr. 486
<br /> (~965) formation of improvement district;
<br />Corliss v. Highland Park, 132 tVlich. 152, 93 N.W.
<br />254, 95 N.W. 416 (1903) -formation of improve-
<br />ment district; City of Topeka v. Huntoon, 46 Kan.
<br />634, 26 Pac. 488 {1891)- establishment of sewer
<br />district; Pursiful v. Harlan, 222 Ky. 658, 1 S.W.
<br />2d 'i043 (1928} - change in street grade;Hamrick
<br />~;. ']'owtt of AIbertville, 21 Ala. 465, 122 So. 488,
<br />456 (1929) - street improvement; Goff v. Nolan,
<br />62 How. Pr, N.Y. 323 {1881}- street widening.
<br />
<br /> it is .conceivable that property ownership
<br />by a council member might result in more favor-
<br />able treatment of that property in the assessment.
<br />If that were to result, the assessment might be
<br />challenged for arbitrariness and set aside, whether
<br />or not the council member participated in the
<br />assessment proceedings.
<br />
<br /> 6. Condemnation of land. There should be
<br />little doubt that a council member's ownership
<br />of land or a substantial interest, in land is sb direct
<br />and significant as to preclude participation by the
<br />council member in a resolution for condemnation
<br />of the land. (Eways v. Reading Parking Authoriry,
<br />385 Pa 592,124 Atl. 2d 92, 1956.} The Minnesota
<br />court has not ruled directly on this question
<br />though, in holding that ownership of land ad-
<br />joining a proposed highway did not disqualify a
<br />
<br /> board member from participating in proceedings
<br /> to establish the highway, it hinted that its answer
<br /> might have been different if the owner had been
<br /> entitled to damages because the highway went.
<br /> through his property. (Webster v. Board of Count),
<br /> Commissioners of County of Washington, 26 Minn.
<br /> 220, 2 N.W. 697, 1897.} ..
<br />
<br /> 7. Street vacation. The Minnesota court has
<br />not passed on this question, but the Attorney
<br />General has ruled that under the reasoning of the
<br />case of Petition of Jacobsen, 234 Minn. 296, 48
<br />N.W. 2d 441 (1951), a-council member who has
<br />an interest in property abutting a street proposed
<br />'to be vacated may not participate in the street
<br />vacation proceedings. (A.G. Op. 396g-16, LMC
<br />'130d.) He relied also on Pyatt v. Mayor and
<br />Council of Borough of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548,
<br />89 Ail. 2d 1 (1952}. That case held that two.
<br />'council members who were employees of 'the
<br />company whose plant abutted the street to be
<br />vacated were "infected with the taint of self-
<br />interest, that a street vacation proceeding before
<br />the council was judicial in character, and the or-
<br />dinance vacating the street.was therefore voidabib
<br />because of the ancient principle that "no man
<br />shall be a judge in his own cause." To the same
<br />effect is Smith v. City of Centralia, 55 Wash.
<br />573, 104 Pac. 797 0909}'.. '
<br /> it is argUable that a street, vacation is not
<br />essentially different from the establishment of
<br />the street in the first instance as to which abuttifig
<br />owners have been held not to have a disqualifying
<br />interest. See 4 above. However, in view of cases
<br />like those cited above as welt as the Attorney
<br />General's ruling based on the Jacobsen case, it
<br />would be wise for a council member owning pro-
<br />perry abutting a street proposed to be vacated
<br />to refrain from participating in vacation proceeding.
<br />before the council -'~' ..
<br />
<br /> 8. Zoning decisions. No Minnesota case 'has
<br />dealt with the conflict of interest principle as
<br />applied to council decisions in zoning matters.
<br />Probably whether or not the member's property
<br />ownership disqualifies him from participating in
<br />the council action will depend, to some extent at
<br />least, on the amount of that interest as compared
<br />to all land affected by the decision. At one extreme
<br />is adoption of a new zoning ordinance or a compre-
<br />hensive revision of an existing ordinance which
<br />may have an impact on all property in the city·
<br />Here the council member's interest is not personal
<br />and he should be able to participate. Otherwise,
<br />since almost all council members may be property-
<br />owners, no such ordinance could ever be adopted.
<br />
<br /> At the other extreme is the application for a
<br />zoning variance or special use permit applying only
<br />to property owned by the council member. Clearly
<br />he has such a special interest here to disqualify him
<br />from participating in the proceedings except to
<br />submit the requisite application to the city. Between
<br />
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