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these extremes will be many proceedings affecting <br />a few lots or parcels only one of which will be <br />owned by a council member. Ih such cases, ques- <br />lions of fact will be presented as to the council <br />member's possible disqualification. If the council <br />member chooses to vote, his disqualification will <br />be before the council to decide, subject to review <br />in the courts if challenged. There will be many <br />situations where the right to vote is so doubtful <br />that the member will be wise to refrain from <br />participating. <br /> <br /> The Attorney General appears not to have <br />ruled directly on the conflict of interest issue <br />in zoning cases except to conclude in one opinion <br />that it was a question of fact whether a town <br />board member who had sold on a contract for <br />deed lahd which was the subject of rezoning <br />had a disqualifying interest. (A.G. Op. 471-f, <br />LMC 130d, Sept. 13, 1963.) The Attorney General <br />appeared to assume, however, that if the board <br />member had a sufficient interest in the land, <br />he would be disqualified from voting on the <br />rezoning. A similar assumption is implicit in the <br />case of Van Itailie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, <br />28 N.J. 146 Atl. 2d 111, which held that a council- <br />man was not disqualified from voting on a zoning <br />ordinance change because his brother was employed <br />by a corporation interested in the change. See <br />also Low v. Town of.Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 <br />Azl. 2d 744 (1948} holding that a member of a <br />zoning commission was disqualified from voting <br />on his wife's application 'for a change of an area <br />from residential to business. And in Crawford ~ <br />~rewstero 225 Ga. 404, 169 S.E.. 2d 317, it was <br />held that under a statute forbidding a vote b,/ a <br />councilman on. a matter in which he is personally <br />interested (previously construed by the court <br />to mean financially interested}, a councilman <br />who, with his wife, is' employed by a private <br />school affected by a proposed rezoning is not <br />precluded from voting. However, in Josephson <br />v JPlannmg J?oard of City of,gtarnford, 151 Conn. <br />489, 199 A 2d 691 {1964},a zoning board member <br />who for 12 years had received free desk space <br />and telephone service from a realtor who was <br />invol,ed in an application for a zoning change <br />was held disqualified. <br /> <br /> 9. Urban renewal decisions. An interest <br />in property which is the subject of an urban <br />renewal decision may be a ground for disqualifi- <br />cation, but when the property is within the area of <br />a larger urban renewal program bu~ not in the <br />project area which is the subject of the decision, <br />this probably is not a disqualification. See Anderson <br />v City of£arsons, 209 Kan. 337~ 496 Pac 2d 1333 <br />{t972). Similarly the ownership of nea[by pro- <br />perry does not disqualify a planning board member <br />from participating in a decision to redevelop <br />bl,ghted property. (Igilson v. City of £ong Branch, <br />27 N.J. 360, 142 Afl. 2d 837, 1958.) Employment <br />by ti~e owner of p~operty in an area which is the <br />subject of an urban renewal decision is a sufficient <br /> <br />-13- <br /> <br />interest to disqualify a council member from <br />voting. (Wilson ~.. Ionia City,. 165 N.~. 2d 813 <br />la'., 1969; Grtggs v £orough o.f Princeton, 33 <br />N.J. 207,162 All. 2d 862, 1960.) <br /> <br /> 10. License issuance and regulation. Though <br /> there have been no Minnesota cases on the subject, <br /> it would seem clear that when a council member <br /> is an applicant for a license to be granted by the <br /> council, he is'so personally interested financially <br /> that he may not take part in the decision on his <br /> application. IVan Hovenberg ~. ttoIman, 201 <br /> Ark. 370, 144 S.W. 2d 718, 1940; Clark ~ <br /> coholic ~Beverage Commission, 54 R.I. 1;26, 170 <br /> All. 79, 19340 Even were a general licensing <br /> ordinance the sublect of the action, the member's <br /> own interest if he held a license might present <br /> him with a sufficient possibl~ty of conflict of <br /> interest to make him disqualified. The Attorney <br /> General once ruled that' a councilman who.is a <br /> part-time employee of a liquor licensee should <br /> not vote on the question of reduction of the <br /> liquor license fee if he can be shown to be per- <br /> sonally interested in the matter on the ground, <br /> for example, that the fee. reduction wil~ affect. <br /> his compensation or the tenure of his' position, <br /> This would be a fact question m a particular <br /> case, (A,G, Op, 218-R, LMC 'I40B, Apr~l 29, <br /> 1952.) <br /> <br /> Need for Interested Officials to Make the Decision <br /> <br /> One of the five .~elevant factors which the <br />Court in I. enz v. Coon Creek Watershed District, <br />278 Minn. 1,153 N.W. 2d 209 (1967) said should <br />be considered in determining whether there is a <br />disqualifying interest in a particular case "the <br />need, if any, for interested officials to make the <br />decision." This idea is expressed in a number of <br />cases elsewhere. For example, in.' Gonzales ~.. <br />Dairy Falley, 265 Cai. App. 446, 71 Cai. Reptr <br />255 (1968) it was held that when an admin:s- <br />trative body has a duty to act upon a matter wh:ch <br />i5 before it and it is the only entity capable of <br />acting on the matter, the fact that members may <br />ha~e a personal interest in the ~esult does not. <br />disqualify them from Performing thek duty. <br />in that case council members owned stock in a <br />corporation seeking a special use permit. :. <br /> <br /> Professor Da,is in his Adrnims'rrative <br />Treatise, Vol 2, Section 12.06 has suggested <br />that the aspect of the conflict of interest rules' <br />most ~n need of critical examination ~s the applica- <br />tion of the ru!e of necessity. In invoking this <br />rule, the' courts should always determine whether <br />in the circumstances the system of allowing the <br />decision to be made by d.squalified officials <br />denies due p~ocess. And when the rule of neces- <br />sity is applied, re~,iewing courts may well consider <br />that the disqualification of the ofhce~s makes <br />appropriate an intensification of judicial review.' <br /> <br />Other Means Available <br /> <br /> <br />