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these extremes will be many proceedings affecting
<br />a few lots or parcels only one of which will be
<br />owned by a council member. Ih such cases, ques-
<br />lions of fact will be presented as to the council
<br />member's possible disqualification. If the council
<br />member chooses to vote, his disqualification will
<br />be before the council to decide, subject to review
<br />in the courts if challenged. There will be many
<br />situations where the right to vote is so doubtful
<br />that the member will be wise to refrain from
<br />participating.
<br />
<br /> The Attorney General appears not to have
<br />ruled directly on the conflict of interest issue
<br />in zoning cases except to conclude in one opinion
<br />that it was a question of fact whether a town
<br />board member who had sold on a contract for
<br />deed lahd which was the subject of rezoning
<br />had a disqualifying interest. (A.G. Op. 471-f,
<br />LMC 130d, Sept. 13, 1963.) The Attorney General
<br />appeared to assume, however, that if the board
<br />member had a sufficient interest in the land,
<br />he would be disqualified from voting on the
<br />rezoning. A similar assumption is implicit in the
<br />case of Van Itailie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes,
<br />28 N.J. 146 Atl. 2d 111, which held that a council-
<br />man was not disqualified from voting on a zoning
<br />ordinance change because his brother was employed
<br />by a corporation interested in the change. See
<br />also Low v. Town of.Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60
<br />Azl. 2d 744 (1948} holding that a member of a
<br />zoning commission was disqualified from voting
<br />on his wife's application 'for a change of an area
<br />from residential to business. And in Crawford ~
<br />~rewstero 225 Ga. 404, 169 S.E.. 2d 317, it was
<br />held that under a statute forbidding a vote b,/ a
<br />councilman on. a matter in which he is personally
<br />interested (previously construed by the court
<br />to mean financially interested}, a councilman
<br />who, with his wife, is' employed by a private
<br />school affected by a proposed rezoning is not
<br />precluded from voting. However, in Josephson
<br />v JPlannmg J?oard of City of,gtarnford, 151 Conn.
<br />489, 199 A 2d 691 {1964},a zoning board member
<br />who for 12 years had received free desk space
<br />and telephone service from a realtor who was
<br />invol,ed in an application for a zoning change
<br />was held disqualified.
<br />
<br /> 9. Urban renewal decisions. An interest
<br />in property which is the subject of an urban
<br />renewal decision may be a ground for disqualifi-
<br />cation, but when the property is within the area of
<br />a larger urban renewal program bu~ not in the
<br />project area which is the subject of the decision,
<br />this probably is not a disqualification. See Anderson
<br />v City of£arsons, 209 Kan. 337~ 496 Pac 2d 1333
<br />{t972). Similarly the ownership of nea[by pro-
<br />perry does not disqualify a planning board member
<br />from participating in a decision to redevelop
<br />bl,ghted property. (Igilson v. City of £ong Branch,
<br />27 N.J. 360, 142 Afl. 2d 837, 1958.) Employment
<br />by ti~e owner of p~operty in an area which is the
<br />subject of an urban renewal decision is a sufficient
<br />
<br />-13-
<br />
<br />interest to disqualify a council member from
<br />voting. (Wilson ~.. Ionia City,. 165 N.~. 2d 813
<br />la'., 1969; Grtggs v £orough o.f Princeton, 33
<br />N.J. 207,162 All. 2d 862, 1960.)
<br />
<br /> 10. License issuance and regulation. Though
<br /> there have been no Minnesota cases on the subject,
<br /> it would seem clear that when a council member
<br /> is an applicant for a license to be granted by the
<br /> council, he is'so personally interested financially
<br /> that he may not take part in the decision on his
<br /> application. IVan Hovenberg ~. ttoIman, 201
<br /> Ark. 370, 144 S.W. 2d 718, 1940; Clark ~
<br /> coholic ~Beverage Commission, 54 R.I. 1;26, 170
<br /> All. 79, 19340 Even were a general licensing
<br /> ordinance the sublect of the action, the member's
<br /> own interest if he held a license might present
<br /> him with a sufficient possibl~ty of conflict of
<br /> interest to make him disqualified. The Attorney
<br /> General once ruled that' a councilman who.is a
<br /> part-time employee of a liquor licensee should
<br /> not vote on the question of reduction of the
<br /> liquor license fee if he can be shown to be per-
<br /> sonally interested in the matter on the ground,
<br /> for example, that the fee. reduction wil~ affect.
<br /> his compensation or the tenure of his' position,
<br /> This would be a fact question m a particular
<br /> case, (A,G, Op, 218-R, LMC 'I40B, Apr~l 29,
<br /> 1952.)
<br />
<br /> Need for Interested Officials to Make the Decision
<br />
<br /> One of the five .~elevant factors which the
<br />Court in I. enz v. Coon Creek Watershed District,
<br />278 Minn. 1,153 N.W. 2d 209 (1967) said should
<br />be considered in determining whether there is a
<br />disqualifying interest in a particular case "the
<br />need, if any, for interested officials to make the
<br />decision." This idea is expressed in a number of
<br />cases elsewhere. For example, in.' Gonzales ~..
<br />Dairy Falley, 265 Cai. App. 446, 71 Cai. Reptr
<br />255 (1968) it was held that when an admin:s-
<br />trative body has a duty to act upon a matter wh:ch
<br />i5 before it and it is the only entity capable of
<br />acting on the matter, the fact that members may
<br />ha~e a personal interest in the ~esult does not.
<br />disqualify them from Performing thek duty.
<br />in that case council members owned stock in a
<br />corporation seeking a special use permit. :.
<br />
<br /> Professor Da,is in his Adrnims'rrative
<br />Treatise, Vol 2, Section 12.06 has suggested
<br />that the aspect of the conflict of interest rules'
<br />most ~n need of critical examination ~s the applica-
<br />tion of the ru!e of necessity. In invoking this
<br />rule, the' courts should always determine whether
<br />in the circumstances the system of allowing the
<br />decision to be made by d.squalified officials
<br />denies due p~ocess. And when the rule of neces-
<br />sity is applied, re~,iewing courts may well consider
<br />that the disqualification of the ofhce~s makes
<br />appropriate an intensification of judicial review.'
<br />
<br />Other Means Available
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