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November 10, 2016 1 Volume 10 1 Issue 21 Zoning Bulletin <br /> religion by preventing the Church from purchasing the Theater Property; and <br /> (2) treated the Church on unequal terms by permitting movie theater uses but <br /> not religious assembly or church uses at the Theater Property." <br /> Among other things, the Church also challenged the City's former zoning <br /> ordinance(prohibiting church use in a B-1 district)under the First Amendment <br /> to the United States Constitution. The Church claimed that the City's zoning <br /> ordinance—prior to its amendment in April 2015—violated the Church's right <br /> to free speech and assembly to the extent that it"unjustifiably differentiated be- <br /> tween religious assembly uses and secular assembly uses." "The First Amend- <br /> ment generally prevents government from proscribing speech or even expres- <br /> sive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed,"including religious <br /> ideas. <br /> The Church asked the court to find that there were no material issues of fact <br /> in dispute and to issue partial summary judgment in its favor(with respect to li- <br /> ability and not damages)—on two claims:(1)violation of RLUIPA's equal terms <br /> provision; and (2) violation of the right to free speech and assembly under the <br /> First Amendment.The City asked the court to issue summary judgment in its <br /> favors as to all claims against it. <br /> DECISION:Motions granted in part and denied in part. <br /> The United States District Court, District of Minnesota, first held that the <br /> Church's RLUIPA claims against the City were barred by RLUIPA's safe harbor <br /> provision. RLUIPA's "safe harbor"provision "allows a government to avoid <br /> RLUIPA's `preemptive force'by changing its policies and practices."The safe <br /> harbor provision specifically provides: "A government may avoid the preemp- <br /> tive force of any provision of[RLUIPA]by changing the policy or practice that <br /> results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining the policy or <br /> practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise,by provid- <br /> ing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially <br /> burden religious exercise,or by any other means that eliminates the substantial <br /> burden."(42 U.S.C.A. §2000cc-3(e).) <br /> Here, in April 2015, the City had amended the zoning ordinance to allow <br /> "Assembly" uses—including movie theaters and places of worship—as <br /> conditional uses in the B-1 district,"and had issued a conditional use permit to <br /> the Church that allowed the Church to use the Theater Property for"Assembly" <br /> purposes.The court found that the April zoning amendment and the issuance of <br /> the conditional use permit to the Church,taken together,"permitted the Church <br /> to purchase the Theater Property for use as a place of worship'and placed the I <br /> Church on equal footing with secular assemblies, including movie theaters." <br /> Accordingly,the court concluded that the zoning amendment and the conditional <br /> use permit "eliminated any alleged substantial burden and any alleged <br /> discriminatory treatment imposed by the former zoning ordinance or by the <br /> City's denial of the Church's Planning Application."Thus, the court held that <br /> RLUIPA's safe harbor provision applied,and the Church's RLUTPA claims were <br /> barred.The Court granted summary judgment to the City on the RLUIPA claims. <br /> As to the Church's First Amendment claims,the court declined to issue sum- <br /> mary judgment on the free speech and assembly claims. The court first noted <br /> that the zoning ordinance was a content-neutral restriction on speech(since'the <br /> focus of the ordinance was on "genuine public health, safety, and general <br /> welfare issues"), still subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny, and therefore <br /> 4 ©2016 Thomson Reuters <br />