Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/2017

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March 10, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 5 Zoning Bulletin basis of religion by prohibiting three distinct types of regulations: (1) land use regulations that treat a "religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution" ("Equal Terms Provision"); (2) land use regulations that "discriminate[ ] against any as- sembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination" ("Nondiscrimination Provision"); and (3) land use regulations that "totally exclude[ ] religious assemblies from a jurisdiction," or "unreasonably limit[ ] religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdic- tion" ("Exclusions and Limits Provision"). (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(b)(1)- (3)•) ISBR also contended that the language in the Parking Ordinance, which gave the Planning Board discretion to require parking spaces in excess of the 3:1 ratio based on presented "documentation and testimony" was unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. ISBR motioned, asking the court to issue partial summary judgment on the pleadings based on those two challenges. DECISION: ISBR's motion granted. The United States District Court, D. New Jersey, found in favor of ISBR on its challenges. The court first held that the Planning Board violated RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination Provision when the Planning Board applied the Parking Ordinance differently on the basis of religion. In so holding, the court examined the language of the Parking Ordinance. The court found that the Parking Ordinance specifically set forth a 3:1 ratio between seats and parking spaces for "churches." Since the Ordinance failed to define "churches," the court looked to the dictio- nary definition of the word. The dictionary defined "church" as "a place of worship of any religion ([e.g.] a Muslim [mosque])." The court concluded that the 3:1 ratio in the Parking Ordinance applied not only to Christian churches, as the Planning Board had concluded, but also to synagogues and mosques. Thus, the court found that, on its face, the Park- ing Ordinance was neutral and generally applicable and therefore was not a "facial" violation of RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination Provision. The court however, found that the "application" of the Parking Ordinance by the Planning Board to ISBR constituted discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination Provision. The court explained that the Planning Board's intent to apply the 3:1 ratio differently on the basis of religion was sufficient to establish discriminatory intent under RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination Provision. The court said it was unnecessary for ISBR to prove that the Planning Board harbored hostility toward Muslims. The court further explained that, where a government expressly discriminates on the basis of religion, RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination Provision does not require a showing of a similarly situated comparator. Accordingly, the court found that, here, ISBR, did not need to show how the Parking Ordinance treated other 10 ©2017 Thomson Reuters