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Heavy rains in zolo revealed flaws in the maintenance of this levee <br />protecting the Mission Lakes subdivision in Desert Hot Springs, California. <br />Without strong and stable associa- <br />tion management, what had once been a <br />"guarantee" between the developer and the <br />municipality risks becoming an unsustainable <br />burden for owners. <br />RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CODE REFORM <br />Require a maintenance plan for any subdivi- <br />sion proposal that includes flood control or <br />stormwater management facilities that would <br />be managed and maintained by owners. This <br />plan must identify what expertise will be nec, <br />essary, where it can be obtained, what main- <br />tenance will be required, and the annual cost <br />likely to be incurred by the owners of the sub- <br />division to carry out those obligations. Cost <br />estimates and work scope should be based <br />on an evaluation by an estimator independent <br />of the developer just as if the city itself were <br />taking ownership. <br />If the funding proposed for maintenance <br />and repair of critical infrastructure relies on <br />assessments levied only on homes within that <br />subdivision, the proponent must demonstrate <br />not just adequate funding for construction, <br />but at least a 3o-year funding plan that in- <br />cludes allowances for inflation, delinquent <br />assessments, expert assistance, a disaster <br />contingency, and a realistic reserve for long- <br />term maintenance and replacement. The city <br />or county should have the authority to step <br />in and levy additional assessments to pay <br />for inspections, maintenance, or repair, and <br />the authority to make emergency repairs. Ad- <br />equate funding may mean owner assessments <br />must be set higher than the proponent wants <br />to qualify enough buyers. Assessment under - <br />funding to attract sales is a popular tool, but <br />that can leave the subdivision unable to ad- <br />dress long-term maintenance of critical facili- <br />ties and force the city or county to advance its <br />own funds to do it. <br />If a critical improvement's projected cost <br />to repair or rebuild is greater than, say, 15 <br />percent of the market value of all of the lots <br />in the subdivision and if there isn't adequate <br />insurance or government assistance, the <br />owners may not voluntarily raise the funds to <br />rebuild it, and there won't be sufficient equity <br />to support a special assessment secured by a <br />lien. Cities and counties should not count on <br />the equity in the homes for reimbursement for <br />emergency repairs. There is always an upper <br />limit on emergency funds that any community <br />association can raise by assessing its owners, <br />and the equity in the homes may be illusory. <br />Lenders usually have priority to whatever <br />equity there is, and equity does not always in- <br />crease with time —especially where the project <br />has been damaged by a natural disaster. <br />Public officials not experienced with the <br />long-term management of a community asso- <br />itT <br />ciation may ask why ordinances or provisions <br />in an association's governing documents can't <br />be used to enforce compliance with a commu- <br />nity's obligation to properly maintain critical <br />infrastructure. They can be, but someone has <br />to know that enforcement is necessary. A ju- <br />risdiction that rarely inspects private facilities <br />may not know of the condition until the facility <br />fails. When that happens, years of neglect will <br />cost much more to remedy than if the city or <br />county itself had conducted regular inspec- <br />tions and performed necessary maintenance. <br />The local municipality can reserve for <br />itself, by ordinance or conditions of approval, <br />the right of reimbursement from the owners in <br />the subdivision for any funds it has to spend <br />to maintain or repair critical facilities. <br />But even if that right exists, it may not be <br />useful. To realize cash would require foreclo- <br />sure and a dispute with tenders with superior <br />rights. In some states, associations enjoy prior- <br />ity lien status over lenders, but they are in the <br />minority. Usually lenders' rights come first, and <br />there may well be nothing left after that. If it <br />should come to that, the municipality should <br />instead take ownership of the infrastructure in <br />the beginning and use its expertise and taxing <br />authority to maintain it, rather than wait to see <br />if the lay owners will do the job properly. There <br />is definitely a "tipping point" where a critical <br />piece of infrastructure is too expensive or too <br />sophisticated to be maintained by lay home <br />owners. The trick is recognizing that in the be- <br />ginning and convincing the municipality it is a <br />better candidate to own it. <br />TOWARD 'BETTER' PRACTICES <br />The examples below discuss steps three specif- <br />ic jurisdictions have taken`to minimize the risks <br />associated with delegating maintenance re- <br />sponsibilities to community associations. While <br />these approaches do not address every poten- <br />tial problem, they do show how some cities and <br />counties are going beyond the status quo. <br />Lake County, Illinois: Requiring <br />Maintenance Plans <br />Effective management of flood mitigation <br />infrastructure requires regular inspections, <br />specialized upkeep, and dedicated funding. <br />A community association that is unfamil- <br />iar with or unwilling to dedicate the time, <br />funds, or expertise to proper maintenance <br />of critical disaster mitigation infrastructure <br />is likely to suffer significant impacts in the <br />event of a flood. <br />ZONINGPRACTICE 3.17 <br />AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION Ipage5 <br />