Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/04/2017

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Zoning Bulletin April 10, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 7 The court also rejected the Church's claims that the Town violated RLUIPA's substantial burden and equal terms provisions. The court explained that RLU- IPA's substantial burden provision states that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution," unless doing so "is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest." (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1).) The equal terms provision provides that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution." (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(b)(1).) The court found the Town did not substantially burden the Church's religious exercise by denying it an electronic sign because the Church still had an existing sign at the same location, at the end of its driveway, whose message was capable of being changed manually. The court found "the Church's assertions that it lacked the manpower to change the sign every single day, and that occasional inclement weather is an impediment," were insufficient to amount to substantial burdens of the Church's religious exercise. The court found that the Town did not violate RLUIPA's equal terms provision by denying the Church an electronic sign while allowing a nearby gas station and public school to have electronic signs. The court concluded that the Church failed to prove that it had been treated less well than "a similarly situated secular comparator." The gas station was not "valid comparator" as its sign was grandfathered—and the Church was "ineligible for grandfathering based on chronology, not religious identity." The public school also was not a "valid comparator" as the state prohibited the Town of power to regulate governmental land uses such as the public school, and the Church was not a governmental land use. Finally, the court rejected the Church's due process claims, finding that the Church failed to allege that constitutionally adequate state law remedies —such as an ordinary zoning appeal of the Board's decision to state superior court —were unavailable. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. See also: Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984). See also: Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City Of Concord, N.H., 513 Rid 27 (1st Cit: 2008). See also: Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 E3d 25, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20251 (1st Cii: 2005). See also: Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 E3d 975 (7th Cir. 2006). See also: Prinaera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 E3d 1295 (11th Cit: 2006). Case Note: An appeal to this decision was filed on February 22, 2017, in the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. 6 2017 Thomson Reuters 11